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The Information Age has created an increasing abundance of data and has, thanks to the rise of
the Internet, made that knowledge instantly available to humans and computers alike. This is not
without caveats, however, as though we may read a document, ask an expert, or locate a fact nearly
effortlessly, we lack a ready means to determine whether we should actually believe them.
We seek to address this problem with a computational trust system capable of substituting for
the user’s informed, subjective judgement, with the understanding that truth is not objective and
instead depends upon one’s prior knowledge and beliefs, a philosophical point with deep practical
implications.
First, however, we must consider the even more basic question of how the trustworthiness of
an information source can be expressed: measuring the trustworthiness of a person, document,
or publisher as the mere percentage of true claims it makes can be extraordinarily misleading
at worst, and uninformative at best. Instead of providing simple accuracy, we instead provide a
comprehensive set of trust metrics, calculating the source’s truthfulness, completeness, and bias,
providing the user with our trust judgement in a way that is both understandable and actionable.
We then consider the trust algorithm itself, starting with the baseline of determining the truth
by taking a simple vote that assumes all information sources are equally trustworthy, and quickly
move on to fact-finders, iterative algorithms capable of estimating the trustworthiness of the source
in addition to the believability of the claims, and proceed to incorporate increasing amounts of
information and declarative prior knowledge into the fact-finder’s trust decision via the General-
ized and Constrained Fact-Finding frameworks while still maintaining the relative simplicity and
tractability of standard fact-finders.
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Ultimately, we introduce Latent Trust Analysis, a new type of probabilistic trust model that
provides the first strongly principled view of information trust and a wide array of advantages over
preceding methods, with a semantically crisp generative story that explains how sources “generate”
their assertions in claims. Such explanations can be used to justify trust decisions to the user,
and, moreover, the transparent mechanics make the models highly flexible, e.g. by applying reg-
ularization via Bayesian prior probabilities. Furthermore, as probabilistic models they naturally
support semi-supervised and supervised learning when the truth of some claims or the trustworthi-
ness of sources is already known, unlike fact-finders which are perform only unsupervised learning.
Finally, with Generalized Constrained Models, a new structured learning technique, we can ap-
ply declarative prior knowledge to Latent Trust Analysis models just as we can with Constrained
Fact-Finding.
Together, these trust algorithms create a spectrum of approaches that trade increasing com-
plexity for greater information utilization, performance, and flexibility, although even the most
sophisticated Latent Trust Analysis model remains tractable on a web-scale dataset. As our trust
algorithms improve our ability to separate the wheat from the chaff, the curse of modern “informa-
tion overload” may become a blessing after all.
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The Information Age has created an increasing abundance of data and has, thanks to the rise
of the Internet, made that knowledge instantly available to humans and computers alike. This
information explosion is not without its caveats, however, as though we may read a document,
ask an expert, or locate a fact nearly effortlessly, we lack a ready means to determine whether we
should actually believe them, particularly when different sources make contradictory claims and
each has their own, sometimes hidden, motivations in providing them. Ideally, we would like to
identify those sources, documents and facts whom we would trust if we had the time and ability
to consider all the information that is available to us, both for direct human consumption (e.g.
selecting which news article to read) and as a component of a larger artificial intelligence system
(e.g. an automated trader determining which stocks to buy and sell). Considering the innumerable
heuristics we already use everyday–choosing the top page in search results, accepting the claim
with the most votes, trusting the user with the best feedback, etc.–and how readily these can be
confounded (e.g. via “search engine optimization” or Sybil attacks), it is clear that an effective
system for ascertaining trustworthiness already has the immediate potential to greatly improve
existing applications, and will become even more vital with time.
Since a comprehensive analysis of the abundant information available is clearly an infeasible
task for any one person, we must seek a computational model that will reason about and assign
trust and belief as the user’s proxy. Indeed, my thesis is that such a computational trust system
can be reliably and effectively substituted for the user’s own informed and subjective judgement,
especially in domains where being fully informed is human-infeasible. By analogy, one cannot read
every document on the web, but we can still use Google to search (most of) them. And, just as
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Google considers the user’s history and profile in selecting which documents to present, we must
consider the user’s prior knowledge and beliefs in determining which claims to believe.
Pragmatically, while subjective accuracy is the chief measure of a trust proxy, other concerns
must also be addressed. Often the corpora of interest are web-scale, large enough to not only exceed
human feasibility, but also computational feasibility should the algorithm require exponential or
even super-linear time (in extreme cases). Furthermore, we must also (perhaps ironically) consider
the user’s confidence in the trust system itself, more readily accomplished, for example, with a
principled generative story and semantically-meaningful parameters than with a set of mechanical
update functions run until convergence.
In this thesis we pursue a progression from less-informed, simple and somewhat ad hoc “fact-
finder” trust models to, ultimately, a highly-informed, sophisticated and principled Latent Trust
Analysis model. However, no model along this path wholly supersedes any other, with tractability
and simplicity exchanged for completeness and accuracy; consequently, every model has its niche
and they, collectively, allow us to perform trust analysis in a broad range of settings.
It should be emphasized, however, that the contributions presented are much broader than
building a specific high-performing trust system. Our Constrained Fact-Finding framework for
incorporating prior knowledge is extendable to all fact-finders, while the subsuming learning frame-
work this inspired, Generalized Constrained Models, can be widely applied to other structured
learning tasks, including the probabilistic Latent Trust Analysis model. Similarly, enhancing fact-
finding algorithms with weighted-edge, deepened information networks and similarity measures can
be done systematically, creating an entire family of new Generalized Fact-Finders. Furthermore, the
performance metrics we have developed provide a formal, standardized method for the direct and
comprehensive evaluation of the trustworthiness of sources and documents regardless of the infor-
mation trust system used; we also concretely establish through experiments that the fundamental
subjectivity of truth and trustworthiness has vital practical importance in many domains.
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1.1 Background
Outside of the digital world, trust is essential, at some level, for almost everything we do. If we
define trust as our belief in the reliability of a resource in serving a desired function, then we can
see how pervasive it is in our daily lives: we trust our alarm clock to awaken us (but not so much
that we do not set a redundant alarm the night before an important meeting), trust our vehicle to
convey us to the office (but not so much that we do not carry auto club membership and a spare
tire), trust our recollection that we have filled the gas tank (but not so much that we do not glance
at the fuel gauge), and so on. Ronald Reagan was fond of the saying “trust, but verify”, which
certainly seems to hold true in many of these everyday actions. As [52] demonstrates, however,
blind trust can often be the best strategy so long as someone else can be trusted to do the necessary
policing; for instance, we assume that our food will not poison us because the government takes
steps to inspect and regulate it. Certain assumptions are also built into the human psyche; e.g. a
baby’s innate fear of heights [74] reflects an implicit belief in the physical phenomenon of gravity.
Indeed, most people have total trust that their next jump over a puddle will not send them flying
into space, strong trust that their salad does not harbor dangerous E. Coli, and reasonable trust
that their alarm clock will not be reset by a power failure in the middle of the night. The level
of trust people insist upon, of course, varies with how easy it is to ascertain as well as its relative
value (as reflected by the confidence policies of [11]). A person buying an inkjet printer may take
the salesman at his word, but a home buyer will hire a home inspector.
Online, trust is equally pervasive. Users regularly place faith in the accuracy of news articles
on nytimes.com, but are generally more guarded with respect to the content of an unfamiliar blog.
Search logs also demonstrate that, when searching for a numerical answer such as the height of a
skyscraper or fuel efficiency of a car, users are likely to examine multiple sources before accepting
an answer [84], showing that not only do they recognize the potential for inaccuracy, they can and
do take steps to mitigate it through their own heuristics. One of the simplest reputation systems for
establishing trust among users, and arguably among the most successful, is eBay’s simple positive-
neutral-negative rating system [22]. Though effective, both of these mechanisms, user heuristics
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and trinary peer recommendations, are clearly flawed–a user can only check some small subset of
the top results (as ranked by their search engine), and eBay’s peer recommendations system is
quite vulnerable to abuse (e.g. a group of conspirators exchanging false recommendations amongst
themselves to boost their reputations). Previous work has addressed both of these issues; this in-
cludes algorithms such as TruthFinder [86, 85] for finding facts across large numbers of websites, and
Eigentrust [46] which can moderate (somewhat) the effects of a self-recommending malicious clique.
However, there is still a great deal of progress that needs to be made: TruthFinder, for example,
is oblivious to any peer recommendations or recommendations between the sources (which can be
implicit, e.g. a New York Times article citing the Chicago Tribune), while Eigentrust conversely
limits itself to recommendations alone, ignoring other available data, such as the comment that ac-
companies (and perhaps clarifies) a rating in eBay’s system. Consequently, one of the goals of our
work is the incorporation of as much relevant data as possible into the trust decision, going beyond
the trust network and factual assertions to include other observations, such as the sophistication
of the design of a source website (which, among many other factors, is known to influence human
trust judgements [28, 29, 30, 80, 8]).
Approximating the judgement of the user is important because ultimately a human (or other
agent) is employing our trust system as his proxy, to determine how much to trust a given entity
or claim would have if he were to examine all the relevant information himself with unlimited
cognitive resources and his own prior knowledge. Of course, this presumes a rational user, which
is known to be false in general [42], but we can reasonably assume that the user would nonetheless
prefer (and expect) a rational judgment. Idiosyncratic prior knowledge among users, however,
still makes the “correct”, rational trust decision a deeply subjective and thus individual exercise.
Consider two people, user A who believes that man landed on the moon in 1969 with 99% certainty,
and user B who believes the moon landing was a hoax with 99% certainty; given a collection of
documents concerning space exploration and their authors, the trust placed in each entity will vary
considerably, and we can reasonably expect user A to place high trust in NASA scientists and very
low trust in conspiracy theorists, whereas for user B this would be reversed. Note that neither user

















Figure 1.1: Outline of Chapters 3–6, showing the connections between them. Comprehensive
Trust Metrics provide a means of expressing the trustworthiness computed by trust algorithms.
The Generalized and Constrained Fact-Finding frameworks add non-declarative (e.g. source
attributes and uncertainty) and declarative (e.g. “A ∧B ⇒ C”) prior knowledge to fact-finders.
Constrained Fact-Finding is abstracted by Generalized Constrained Models, and Generalized
Constrained Models then add declarative prior knowledge to Latent Trust Analysis models.
knowledge, and need to assign trust in a manner consistent with this. Indeed, the assumption of a
universal “truth” (e.g. a fact is correct or incorrect, an entity is trustworthy or not) is one of the
principle oversights of previous work, as a consequence of either the omission of prior knowledge
from these systems altogether, or the assumption that such knowledge is universal.
1.2 Overview
We next review the concept of “trust” in computer science as it applies to a variety of problems and
domains, all driven by the need to establish reliability in other entities, splitting this prior work
into policy-based, theoretical, reputation-based, user-driven, and information-based approaches.
Our own work can be seen as information-based, but also, as we will leverage the relationships and
properties of the sources, reputation-based, and we seek to broadly position and motivate it relative
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to the broader context, although we will save more detailed comparisons for the individual Related
Work sections of the subsequent chapters.
One of the first questions that we must then address is how we can even measure a source
or document’s trustworthiness; certainly, when we evaluate a trust algorithm, we are concerned
with its ability to correctly identify true claims, but extending such a simple accuracy metric to
the providers of claims can be both misleading and disappointingly uninformative—the user may
not wish to read a highly biased and incomplete document merely because it is factually correct.
Rather, we propose a set of three comprehensive trust metrics, truthfulness, completeness, and
bias, that are able to materially inform the user of the quality of a source or document and help
them decide whether and how to rely upon them, and we are able to quantify this advantage, albeit
only coarsely, with a small user study. Furthermore, while these metrics are orthogonal to the
construction of the trust systems themselves, they nonetheless both aid in framing the problem as
a whole and reinforce the recurring theme of the subjectivity of trust which permeates our work.
Following this, we begin considering the families of algorithms that may be used to determine
belief and trust, starting with fact-finders. Fact-finders view the trust problem as a bipartite graph
of the information sources and the claims they assert, iteratively updating the trustworthiness
score of each source based on the believability of the claims it asserts, and updating the belief
score of each claim based on the trustworthiness of the sources asserting it. These algorithms are
extremely fast (linear time), more effective than simple voting, and fairly easy to implement. We
explore the family of fact-finding algorithms as a whole, and additionally introduce three novel,
high-performing algorithms: Average·Log, Investment, and PooledInvestment. The performance of
these new fact-finders compares very favorably to state-of-the-art fact-finders from the literature
on several real-world datasets, and we will revisit the same setup throughout our later experiments.
One limitation of fact-finders is their sole reliance on the source-claim graph; they are unable
to exploit any information beyond “who says what”. However, there is a great deal of valuable,
additional information that could better inform our trust decision if only we were able to take
advantage of it, such as: the properties of the sources (their degrees, professional associations,
quality of writing, etc.), the uncertainty of information extraction (deriving from either inherent
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ambiguities in the underlying text or an imperfect information extraction engine), and similarities
among the claims (a source claiming the birthplace of Obama as “California” disagrees less with
someone else claiming “Hawaii” than they would someone claiming “Kenya”). We introduce a new
framework that generalizes fact-finding algorithms from unweighted, bipartite source-claim graphs
to weighted, k-partite graphs that are capable of encoding a wide variety of auxiliary information,
while still leveraging the diversity and performance of existing fact-finding algorithms. Moreover,
our experiments demonstrate that even small amounts of additional information can dramatically
improve the accuracy of Generalized Fact-Finders over their standard variants, and the modifi-
cations necessary to generalized existing fact-finding algorithms can be applied in a mechanistic,
rule-driven matter.
Despite the power of Generalized Fact-Finders, however, they do still omit one very key as-
pect: the user’s prior knowledge. For example, a user might know that ∀xLegalPresident(x) ⇒
BornIn(x, US);∀x,yBornIn(x, y) ∧Within(y, US) ⇒ BornIn(x, US);¬Within(Kenya, US), al-
lowing us to reject the claim BornIn(Obama,Kenya) if we also believe LegalPresident(Obama).
With Constrained Fact-Finders, we interleave updating the beliefs in the claims via the underlying
fact-finding algorithm with a “correction” of those beliefs in accordance with the declarative prior
knowledge we are provided, finding a corrected set of beliefs that satisfies our constraints while
minimizing the distance from the original beliefs. Our experiments demonstrate that not only does
prior knowledge, like Generalized Fact-Finding, further increase accuracy by incorporating more
information, it is also absolutely essential when the subjective truth of the user differs from the
majority. Further, Constrained Fact-Finding remains tractable by enforcing its constraints via a
polynomial-time linear program rather than an exponential-time integer linear program, as other
research into the application of declarative constraints has often used. As it is orthogonal to Gen-
eralized Fact-Finding, both techniques may be used jointly to create a tractable, highly informed
fact-finding framework, capable of greater performance than either approach on its own, and far
surpassing the standard fact-finders they supersede.
Inspired by the Constrained Fact-Finding approach, we introduce a subsuming method, General-
ized Constrained Models, to enforce prior knowledge in problems far beyond fact-finders, with very
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broad applicability to supervised, semi-supervised and unsupervised structured learning problems.
For supervised learning, Generalized Constrained Models improves upon Constrained Conditional
Models [16] to enforce declarative constraints during inference with an underlying probabilistic
model, with GCMs selecting the (truly) most probable distribution over the latent variables that
satisfies the constraints, while CCMs instead find the satisfying distribution that is merely most
probable according to the underlying model. In semi-supervised and unsupervised problems, Iterated
Generalized Constrained Models are a modified-EM approach that can be seen as generalizing tech-
niques such as Constraint Driven Learning [15] and Posterior Regularization [33], combining the
best properties of both: the use of declarative constraints, ease of implementation, and polynomial
complexity, all while maintaining similar or better performance in our experiments.
Finally, we consider a new class of principled, probabilistic Latent Trust Analysis models for
determining the trustworthiness of sources and the belief in claims. We initially “bridge the gap”
between fact-finders and LTA by introducing a simple LTA fact-finder, a model where P (claim|X, θ)
may be taken as the claim’s “belief score”, and each source has only a single parameter corresponding
to its scalar trustworthiness score, and the update rules are derived (in closed form) from EM, such
that running the fact-finder performs EM on the model. Afterwards, we break from the fact-
finding paradigm entirely, presenting a sophisticated model capable of capturing all the phenomena
of Generalized Fact-Finders and more, modeling parameters corresponding to user truthfulness
and expertise as well as the “difficulty” of choosing the correct claim from each particular group
of alternatives. This provides a number of important advantages over fact-finders, including far
greater expressiveness and “explainability” (the ability to tell the user why a particular claim is
to be believed or a particular source to be trusted, and tell them the overall generative story that
the model represents); the tradeoff is that, since maximizing the expected (log) likelihood cannot
be done in closed form, performing expectation-maximization to learn the model requires Quasi-




Survey of Computational Trust
In this chapter we explore the field of computational trust, focusing on the work most relevant to
ours but also surveying other areas that help situate our research in the larger picture. We divide the
field into five areas: policy-based, theoretical, reputation-based, user-driven, and information-based,
partially borrowing from the division proposed by [5] (and see also [73] for another survey from a
different and more focused perspective), and additionally consider the related topic of recommender
systems.
2.1 Policy-based
Policy-based trust methods ([45, 88, 64, 51], to name only a few) tend to depend on cryptographic
and credential-oriented means to establish trust in another party, often concerned with with regu-
lating access to a resource as a security policy. Typically credentials are backed by a third-party
authority (e.g. as Thawte does for SSL certificates). These mechanisms are often essential building
blocks for informational trust decisions; e.g. if a malicious user can forge the identity or signature of
an author, he may create untrustworthy documents under his name, either lowering the trust others
place in the victim or, worse, use a high-trust author to propagate falsehoods. With credentials,
however, an author can sign his work cryptographically, and forgery becomes much harder. As an
example, when we employ data provided by Wikipedia in our experiments, we are relying upon




One of the early detailed looks at trust from a computational perspective can be found in [59], which
makes the important observation that trust can be global (as per eBay’s trust score), personal (each
person assigns their own trust values to other entities), or situational (personal and specific to a
given context); situational trust in particular has been poorly studied, although it seems natural to
trust a biologist’s description of mitosis more than his assessment of quantum tunneling, as entities
clearly have varying degrees of expertise and dependability for a given task. [73] observes that the
simple solution of merely creating separate models for each context is flawed, particularly when
data is scarce–while we may not trust our biologist’s physics expertise, for example, a seemingly
good-faith effort that at least loosely approximates the truth suggests he may be trusted to provide
accurate assertions within the domain of biology.
Trust is also key in many game theory strategies. Consider, for instance, an iterated prisoner’s
dilemma. Interestingly, tit-for-tat [7], whereby betrayal is punished with betrayal, and cooperation
rewarded with cooperation, is generally considered the most effective strategy for the game, but
never requires the agent to trust the opponent–betrayal can be identified and punished immediately,
eliminating any incentive to cheat, so the tit-for-tat strategist need only believe that the opponent
is rational. However, when checking for betrayal has a cost [52], trust becomes significant, as a
tit-for-tat strategist verifying his opponent’s action each time will incur a large verification penalty.
Instead, it would be better to check up on an opponent only “once in a while”, but employ more
draconian punishment for betrayal (but less severe than [6]’s absolute ”grim trigger”) such that he
sees no net gain. The occasional verification penalty can be viewed as the cost of establishing and
maintaining trust. Ironically, in the presence of such trust-but-verify agents, purely honest agents do
better, implying that such policing has strong positive externalities and the honest agents are free-
riders (in a real-world context, trust would therefore be a public good whose cost should be shared
by all, as it is with government safety agencies). [62] also examines the game-theoretic elements of
trust, using it to analyze and construct a reputation system where agents learn from the history
of past games and the reputations of other agents, showing (unsurprisingly) that establishing trust
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has a net benefit to the parties involved. Game theory is important to our work for two reasons:
it provides a theoretical basis for estimating the value for trust and its costs (and, perhaps, how
they should be distributed), and it helps us understand the motivations and potential strategies of
those who “cheat”. [22] investigates the practical applications of this, finding that traditional trust
mechanisms (such as contract law) are largely unenforceable online, but reputation and trust are
even more vital due to the higher exposure the Internet provides (if a buyer rates you badly on
eBay, everyone will know, not just the buyer’s friends).
Additionally, a large amount of work from fields such as human-computer interaction, economics,
psychology and other social sciences looks at how trust is created and used by people, which has
direct implications for our work developing a trust system that can take into account the full breadth
of relevant information. Much research as it pertains to human-computer interaction specifically has
been done by Fogg’s Persuasive Technologies Lab [80, 8, 28, 30, 29], demonstrating that, besides
factors traditionally considered by trust systems such as recommendations and past reliability,
humans are superficial, placing more faith in a site with a “.org” domain name or a modern,
sophisticated design for example. We note that, though stereotypes, these are nonetheless useful
features, as “.org” websites are often non-profits that may be more truthful than a website trying to
sell a product, and a sophisticated design implies a high degree of investment by the website creator
who has much more at stake if he loses his visitors’ trust than someone whose website was prepared
in an hour. [34] similarly identifies 19 factors that influence trust in the context of the semantic web,
including user expertise (prior knowledge), the popularity of a resource (the [arguable] wisdom of
crowds), apparent bias (similar to “.org” vs. ”.com”) and recency (more recent information is more
likely to be up-to-date and correct). Separately, Fogg et al.’s work also provides insight in the trust
labels and accuracy that a human user would prefer; users with little knowledge about a subject
may desire a “true, false or maybe” judgement of a particular claim, while a domain expert might
require an exact probability–since computing exact trust scores may be expensive, understanding
when approximation is acceptable can potentially offer considerable savings.
Finally, probabilistic logics have been explored as an alternate method of reasoning about trust.
[57] utilizes fuzzy logic [65], an extension of propositional logic permitting [0,1] belief over proposi-
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tions. [87] employs Dempster-Shafer theory [75], with belief triples (mass, belief, and plausibility)
over sets of possibilities to permit the modeling of ignorance, while [44] uses the related subjective
logic [43] which reasons about belief quadruples (belief, disbelief, uncertainty and base rate), where
base rate is an a priori estimate of belief given uncertainty. Directly modeling ignorance provides
an elegant alternative to ad hoc solutions like smoothing, but this must be weighed against its
complexity, and alternatives exist–in our constrained and generalized fact-finders, for example, we
can accomplish the same end by explicitly assigning weight to the unknown. We can also consider
the admitted ignorance of emphsources: for instance, in our Latent Trust Analysis model, we allow
for sources asserting a distribution of belief over the claims with a [0, 1] certainty “weight”.
2.3 Reputation-based
Reputation systems and trust metrics are frequently employed in P2P applications and social
groups. Alternatively, PageRank [13] can be seen as a reputation system where the links im-
ply recommendation, while [49] is similar but employs a dichotomy between hubs and authorities
such that authorities are trusted if they are recommended by many hubs and hubs are trusted if
they recommend many trustworthy authorities. In these and other reputation systems that em-
ploy a (often implied) trust network, there is a core principle of transitivity: if you trust Bob with
T (you,Bob) = 0.9, and he trusts Jane with T (Bob, Jane) = 0.5, then, in the absence of another path
and using a very simple transitivity scheme you might trust Jane T (you, Jane) = 0.5× 0.9 = 0.45.
Of course, transitivity can be much more complex with this; [44] uses the relatively complex op-
erators of subjective logic, while many other systems depend upon an iterative algorithm for trust
propagation. [39] is notable as it features a transitive distrust, which is far from straightforward
(do I trust those distrusted by those I distrust?); however, though negative trust effectively implies
that we “trust” the other entity to betray us, it may be of limited utility: if a user I strongly
distrust claims that the sky is blue, as does someone I trust moderately, should I assume that the
sky is some other color instead? This question of what can be inferred from an untrusted source’s
assertions will reappear with pragmatic importance when we construct the Latent Trust Analysis
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model.
More generally, a major challenge in all transitive trust networks is thwarting manipulation by
malicious users. Eigentrust [46] is capable of reducing their impact on the network by essentially
using pre-selected trustworthy users as a “fount of trust”, such that trust flows from this initial
seed group out to the other peers, forcing malicious users—if they wish to be trusted—to at least
sometimes behave appropriately; the authors found that, in the context of file sharing, malicious
cliques of self-recommending users could deliver the most invalid files to others if they also delivered
the correct file 50% of the time. Sybil attacks [26], where one malicious individual or group can
control a large number of identities in the network, are also often very effective, both because
they allow a large portion of the entities in the network to be coordinated by a single malicious
party and because they allow for the use of disposable sock puppets, online identities that, when
they become distrusted or banned, can be abandoned with a new, clean account taking its place
(creating a sort of “whac-a-mole” game for legitimate users and administrators). There are two
principle ways to mitigate these problems [17, 54], either by verifying the user’s identity or imposing
a cost for creating or maintaining an account to prevent or discourage false user accounts, or by
adopting an asymmetric trust network. Most trust networks are symmetrical, and every user is (a
priori) equally trusted and equally influential. However, an asymmetric trust network such as the
online community Advogato [53] typically has a small core of trusted users (Advogato currently
has four). Because of this, only a chain of recommendations (or “certifications” in Advogato’s
terminology) from the trusted core can impart trust in a user, and, if discounting of transitive trust
is used, that user must be reasonably close to the core. Consequently, collaborating malicious users
acting independently cannot recommend themselves into a higher position of trust regardless of
their number. As an asymmetric counterpart to PageRank and Hubs and Authorities, we also have
TrustRank [40], a link analysis algorithm that starts with a small core of hand-selected, trusted
pages, and then crawls outwards, with the intent of sidestepping self-linking collections of spam
pages. Unfortunately, there are serious weaknesses of asymmetric networks, as a compromised core
user (or someone highly trusted by a core user) can wreak havoc on the system, and individuals
outside the “inner circle” have relatively little power (Advogato assigns global trust, although in
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principle there is no reason this could not be combined with a subjective, per-user trust algorithm to
create a composite score). Note also that some asymmetric networks are more readily compromised
than others: while Eigentrust is also asymmetric, it remains vulnerable because trust scores are
updated automatically and frequently over the course of multiple interactions, allowing malicious
users who are merely sometimes cooperative to capture some of the trust flowing from the trusted
core. It is also worth observing that even Advogato weaknesses have been exploited in practice [79],
as both deceived and complicit high-trust users outside of the inner circle were able to also impart
high trust to another user widely claimed to be a “crank”.
Finally, we point out that not all reputation-based trust schemes are necessarily complex; as
previously mentioned, eBay allows only -1, 0, and +1 ratings (together with a short comment) for a
partner in a transaction, which are summed to obtain a global trust score–although there is a strong
economic incentive for cheating under this system (high trust allows a user to defraud others), it
is still widely considered successful [46, 22], presumably due to a combination of human policing
and buyers performing significant trust assessment of their trading partner beyond the single scalar
score, e.g. by evaluating past auctions, examining photographs of the product, considering the
grammar and spelling used by the seller, etc.
2.4 User-driven
Unlike reputation networks, where trust judgements in the form of recommendations are stated
or implied amongst entities, user-driven trust systems extrapolate from their users’ specific trust
judgements of information sources and the data they provide. This has the disadvantage of requiring
a great deal of user effort (and often expertise) to build a database or semantic web, although this
may be mitigated by software tools and by “piggybacking” on existing annotation tasks where the
additional effort is marginal (e.g. by qualifying “Address = 123 Acme Road” with “P = 0.95” to
express confidence in that claim).
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2.4.1 Databases
Typical elements in a database trust system are data provenance (where data comes from, a “chain
of custody”), access control (credential-based trust), and data conflict resolution to handle con-
tradictions in the data [11]. [19, 18] consider both path similarity and data conflict. They detect
conflict through if-then conditions, reducing the trust score of those data found inconsistent. Path
similarity compares the provenance of the data under consideration by reasoning that if the same
claim comes from two distinct, independent data paths it is more trustworthy than if it had come
from data paths that share entities; this notion of multiple independent sources establishing more
trust than dependent sources also motivates work in inferring duplication among sources in other
domains (such as websites), but here the provenance is assumed to be given in its entirety.
2.4.2 Structured User Analysis
The TRELLIS system [37, 36] is an interface for structuring and annotating the synthesis of con-
clusions from underlying facts, where the reliability and credibility of a source and a claim may be
specified by the user, or inferred by how the claim is used: for example, if a user cites a claim as
support for his ultimate conclusion, this suggests that it is credible, and, conversely, if the claim
is cited but dismissed in the process of building to the conclusion, it may be taken as considered
and refuted by the user. Such structured analysis trees can be queried and exploited by other users
facing the same or similar questions and, when many such trees are considered, the general implied
trustworthiness of information sources and claims may be calculated. This idea is generalized to
arbitrary relations in [34], which also demonstrates the concept via a number of user-simulating
synthetic experiments.
2.4.3 Provenance Systems
A more abstract view are core provenance recording and querying mechanisms. These be specific to
tracking the originator and handlers of a workflow [48] or even a more basic, universally applicable
data format [61, 35]. By us to annotate items with their chain of creation, publication, and revision,
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a user can, for example, decide whether to believe a magazine article by asking if he believes the
cited sources, the author and the publisher. Such reasoning reflects the heuristics people employ
when they, in essence, leverage name recognition to make their decisions—e.g. a Tom Cruise fan
might choose a movie because it stars Tom Cruise, or a Catholic might believe a cited claim because
it was made by the Pope. The catch is, of course, that not only must these provenance annotations
be researched and recorded, but that they themselves be trustworthy, and both of these are difficult
problems in practice: manually researching the provenance of existing documents at web-scale is
infeasible, and even if publishers provided this metadata themselves, we would still be unsure of
whether to trust them.
2.5 Information-based
A number of trust systems establish trust not by user input or implicit or explicit recommendations
among entities but rather by the information that the entities provide, which may be, for instance,
a set of documents or a set of search results. The methods tend to be varied, as are the domains
to which they are applied.
2.5.1 Identifying Source Dependence
In those cases when manually annotated provenance is impractical, we would still like to determine
dependencies among our information sources, but we typically we only have the name of the pub-
lisher or author who provided the information to us. Copying on the World Wide Web is a common
occurrence, and while some sources produce independent, original content exclusively, there are a
myriad of sites that do just the opposite, aggregating data from other sources and republishing it
(e.g. Google News and some blogs), with many sites somewhere in between (Wikipedia contains
a myriad of pages automatically generated from U.S. census data). [24, 25]’s solution is to ob-
serve that, if one source is dependent upon another, they will share the same mistakes along with
a consistent time delay (the copier can only publish after the original has been published), and
that–under the assumption that wrong answers are uniformly distributed–sharing many mistakes
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is very unlikely if two sources are independent. Additionally, [84] considers trust in the context
of numerical search queries (“how old is John Smith?”), observing that two pages that claim the
same fact but are otherwise dissimilar provide better evidence than pages that are nearly identical
of each other because they are more likely to be independent.
There are two chief problems with the assumptions made by such approaches: first, mistakes are
not uniform and independent. Many errors are widely shared (e.g. that Shakespeare was born on
April 23rd, 1564), and if two sources share one mistake, they are more likely to share another, since
they are more likely to share the same assumptions or decision processes and thus arrive at the
same conclusions independently of one other, right or wrong. Second, a closed world is assumed:
if one source produces the same claims as another source but at a later time, he must have copied
that information from the other source. However, outside of scientific literature, very few of the
underlying claims are independently generated by the sources; even in the case of eyewitness reports
(e.g. of a car accident), the underlying event is observable to many parties, and in general people
tend to repeat things (e.g. “the world is round”) that they have not personally verified.
2.5.2 Fact-Finding
Given a large set of sources making conflicting claims, fact-finders determine “the truth” by iter-
atively updating their parameters, calculating belief in facts based on the trust in their sources,
and the trust in sources based on belief in their facts. TruthFinder [86] is a straightforward imple-
mentation of this idea. AccuVote [24, 25] improves on this by using calculated source dependence
(where one source derives its information from another) to give higher credibility to independent
sources. [32]’s 3-Estimates algorithm incorporates the estimated “hardness” of a fact, such that
knowing the answer to an easy question earns less trust than to a hard one (for instance, William
Shakespeare’s birthday is a much trickier question than William Clinton’s). However, fact-finders
fail to incorporate the user’s prior knowledge and the wealth of additional data available for a
particular domain (the information extractor’s confidence level in each source-claim pairing, group
membership of a source, etc.), shortcomings we address in a general, tractable way in Chapter 4,
allowing us to continue to leverage the diversity of existing fact-finders while also overcoming their
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deficiencies.
2.5.3 Specialized Information-based Systems
Many trust systems are specialized for a particular domain, such as wikis. [89] is a relatively simple,
document-level approach, learning a dynamic Bayesian network across the flow of wiki revisions,
using the author and the number of inserted/deleted text fragments as features. Wikitrust [1, 2]
estimates the trustworthiness of edits (at the word level) by considering implicit endorsements by
other editors who make nearby edits or refinements without destroying the original text. These sys-
tems are ultimately intended to help readers of wikis determine which documents (or parts thereof)
to trust, but unfortunately lack the required claim-level granularity and general applicability of
fact-finding systems.
Additionally, many algorithms exist for combining multiple classifiers to make a final prediction.
Where weights are applied to these classifiers in an equitable fashion (i.e. not as in AdaBoost [31]
where the α weights are set sequentially) they can be considered relative degrees of trust: a highly-
weighted classifier, for example, presumably returns the correct answer more frequently than its
less-preferred brethren. A concrete example of this is [50], where the output of multiple rankers is
aggregated by weighted voting, and each ranker’s weights are determined by its agreement with the
others on (unlabeled) training examples. Highly-weighted rankers are taken as the most credible
and therefore contribute the most to the final prediction. Although the weights in such ensemble
classifiers are essentially a side effect of the learning algorithms, they can be correctly interpreted
as trust scores for the underlying classifier “sources”.
2.6 Information Filtering and Recommender Systems
In computational trust our task is to “recommend” trustworthy sources and true information; in a
sense, then, recommendation systems can in principle be seen as addressing a subsuming task. In
practice, of course, the actual methods used and the concrete problems they are applied to are quite
dissimilar, but the extensively studied field of recommender systems still warrants consideration,
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partly for contrast and perspective and partly for cross-task insight.
Information filtering may be content-based, collaborative, or both; see [3] a survey of the field.
Content-based methods compare the objects to be recommended with the user’s demonstrated
preferences, and must thus have some understanding of the domain in which they operate; for
example, [66] represents documents with a set of keywords and uses these to match against profiles
established with explicit user feedback (ratings). There are, however, a few problems with such
systems. First, as with collaborative filtering, users must somehow construct a profile first, either
explicitly by, say, rating the quality of documents, or implicitly, by tracking the time a user spends
looking at documents. In either case, the system cannot provide personalized recommendations
without first being “trained”. One solution is to take an active learning approach and ask the user
to rate those that will best improve performance, as in [4]. A second, similar problem arises from
“overspecialization”, where a user is shown only items similar to those he has seen before; this can be
addressed by either filtering out redundant documents [90] or through some additional randomness
in selection. Finally, the third problem is intrinsic: where similarity is not easily measured (e.g.
photographs) these systems cannot function.
Collaborative filtering, however, avoids this last issue by treating the items as “black boxes”
(as most trust analysis systems treat claims); recommendations are established by determining the
similarity with other users and using these to weight each of their ratings of the item in question.
An example of this is the Google News recommender [20], which relies on implicit user preferences
(which stories they click on) and computes recommendations based upon the stories viewed by
other users who viewed a similar set of stories to the user in the past. These systems may be
“memory based” or “model based” [12], where memory-based systems directly rely upon similarity
to other users or cluster membership while model-based methods instead learn model parameters.
Still, as with content-based systems, there are problems unique to the collaborative approach.
First, assigning a user to a single cluster may be counterproductive; one person may have unique,
diverse sets of interests, such as miniature golf and simulated annealing. Second, it is difficult or
impossible to recommend new items, because these have no user ratings. Third, there is a “sparsity
problem”, where the number of users or the number of ratings is too small to make an accurate
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recommendation, especially when the user is unusual and has few like-minded peers.
Given the hundreds of information filtering systems, and, indeed, recommender systems in
general, there is also the question of evaluation and robustness. Evaluations fall into three categories
[41]: predictive (e.g. predict a user’s movie rating), classification (predict whether a user will like a
movie or not), and rank (predict a preference-ordered list of movies for the user); consequently, the
apparent performance of a recommender varies depending upon which evaluation metric is selected.
Note that, in trust, these are all possible: we can predict the specific belief distribution, mark
each mutually exclusive assertion as “plausible” or ”not plausible”, ”trusted” or ”not trusted”, or
simply rank assertions in the order of believability. Also of interest is that, as with trust algorithms,
there is a need for the user to trust the recommender system, but unlike in trust algorithms, this
may require something beyond superficially correct output: for a book recommender system, for
instance, it seems inappropriate to recommend a book the user has already bought, but, on the other
hand, a user might interpret such a recommendation of something he likes as a sign of dependable
performance.
Also, for systems with a collaborative element, we must again concern ourselves with Sybil-
like attacks whereby many users (or, rather, their sock puppets) alter their behavior to affect the
recommendations other users obtain (e.g. an author creating many ratings “profiles” on a book
review site and then ranking his own books very highly). Some work, such as [60], has already
begun to consider this, and there may be the opportunity to borrow such strategies to counteract
the analogous threats to trust systems.
2.7 Conclusion
Our task is to determine which information sources are trustworthy and which claims can be be-
lieved. Unfortunately, user-driven approaches such as manually labeling credibility and reliability
do not scale well. Reputation networks can in many cases be discovered by inferring implied rec-
ommendations, but can, at best, only tell us which sources are trustworthy without specifically
addressing the claims they make. Instead, we will adopt a primarily information-based approach,
20
examining and comparing what sources actually say, but still leverage other aspects of compu-
tational trust to aid us, much like hybrid recommender systems that combine both content and
collaborative filtering. Indeed, our approaches will cross over numerous boundaries, with policy-
based trust establishing attribution during information extraction, entity recommendations and
attributes coloring our trustworthiness judgements of sources, and user-provided prior knowledge
constraining and qualifying our belief in the claims. Just as no user would ignore such a breadth





Trust systems can analyze information networks to determine the “trustworthiness” of the nodes,
but the scalar values they produce are both opaque and semantically variable, and knowing only
that the trustworthiness of a website is “27” is not helpful to the user. Moreover, the simplistic
means by which they are typically calculated can yield misleading results, sometimes dramatically
so. We present a new, standardized set of trust metrics that instead compute the trustworthiness
of an information source as a triple of truthfulness, completeness, and bias scores, and argue that
these must be calculated relative to the user to be meaningful. We then explore these new metrics
with a user study. As these metrics make no assumptions about the internals of the underlying
trust algorithm they may be applied universally to all information-based trust systems, including
those we introduce in later chapters.
3.2 Introduction
Information-based trust systems [5] are algorithms that, given an information network containing
information sources (e.g. authors, publishers, websites, etc.) making a variety of claims (“the
atomic mass of gold is 42”), determine how much a user should trust the former and believe the
latter (a highly trusted source reliably provides trustworthy documents and a highly believed claim
is likely to be true). As data has become more abundantly available to us, the importance of such
systems has grown tremendously, particularly following the mass adoption of blogs, wikis, message
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boards and other collaborative media; however,the high entry barrier (and enforced journalistic
standards) of older, established media such as newspapers and television is gone. Similarly, with
growing scale, reduced budgets, and instant communication, this “information overload” also vexes
those algorithms that seek to harness it, with an ever-increasing need to sift out the true from the
spurious.
Unfortunately, the assessments produced by these algorithms are simplistic, assigning a proba-
bility or arbitrary weight as the scalar trustworthiness of a source, based upon the accuracy of their
claims. For example, TruthFinder [86] calculates a source’s trustworthiness as the arithmetic mean
of the probabilities of its claims. Consider a short document authored by Sarah: “John is running
against me. Last year, John spent $100,000 of taxpayer money on travel. John recently voted to
confiscate, without judicial process, the private wealth of citizens.” If all of these statements are
true, Sarah and her document would thus be considered highly trustworthy.
However, if we know more about the background, we might find that Sarah is misleading us
and is, in fact, quite untrustworthy despite her factuality (i.e. we should not consider her to be
a reliable source of information). If “John is running against Sarah” is a well-known, “easy” fact
[32], Sarah’s correct assertion thereof is unimportant (taken to the extreme, one could otherwise
pad a document with banalities like “1+1=2, 1+2=3...” to produce a seemingly-trustworthy docu-
ment, regardless of its other content). Further, if $100,000 in travel expenses is par for John’s office
because it necessitates a great deal of travel, Sarah has conveniently neglected to mention this,
instead inviting the reader to compare his costs to their own prior expectation of what “typical”
travel expenses should be and conclude, incorrectly, that John has enjoyed gratuitously luxurious
accommodation. Similarly, Sarah’s “wealth confiscation” typically goes by the slightly more in-
nocuous term “taxation”, but her biased language suggests to the reader that John has approved
of something unusually nefarious.
To counter these problems, we propose assessing trustworthiness not as a scalar, but rather
three separate values: truthfulness, completeness, and bias. Decomposing trust into these three
components allows the trust system’s user to meaningfully assess the extent to which a document
or information source can be relied upon, and calculating them consistently across algorithms
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permits the output of competing trust systems to be directly compared and evaluated. We also
find that the user himself is essential in calculating the trustworthiness of a source, in addition to
the prior knowledge he may bring to the trust system itself (e.g. as we will explore in Chapter
4); for example, if an investor and a politician are each reading about House debates on a new
corporate tax bill, the investor may not care who introduced the bill, while the politician may not
care about the fine-grain details of the tax. An author that occasionally flubs those details may
thus nonetheless still be trusted by the politician, but not the investor. By considering the relative
importance of information and preexisting beliefs of the user, we can better approximate the user’s
own judgment and provide a more accurate trust analysis.
3.3 Background
Broadly speaking, information networks can be categorized as homogeneous and heterogeneous
networks; our metrics apply the latter, but we also briefly discuss the former below for contrast.
3.3.1 Homogenous (Reputation) Networks
Homogeneous reputation networks have only a single type of entity, with edges forming recommen-
dations, votes, or other relationship between two entities in the graph; these are more commonly
known as reputation networks. As discussed in Chapter 2, reputation systems are frequently em-
ployed in P2P applications and social groups, such as Eigentrust [46] and Advogato [53]. Alterna-
tively, PageRank [13] and [49]’s Hubs and Authorities can be seen as reputation systems where links
imply recommendation. However, the amount of information that can be encoded in homogeneous
networks is limited; for news websites we might add edges corresponding to links between them
(again on the basis that these are implicit recommendations), but we would not look at the actual
articles on those websites, or the claims they contain. Thus, while the semantics of trustworthiness
within a reputation network are often relatively straightforward (based on “flows” of trust among
entities) they are a poor choice for information sources, where recommendations among the sources
(if present) are much less important than what the source actually says.
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3.3.2 Heterogeneous Networks
The heterogenous networks seen in trust problems comprise of a number of (possibly hierarchical,
e.g. document→ author→ publisher) information sources, each asserting a number of claims. The
trust system seeks to both find the trustworthiness of these sources and the believability of their
claims, although in the user’s interest may be specific, e.g. determining the atomic weight of gold
or finding trustworthy articles about Bill Clinton.
Fact-finders are the predominant class of algorithms for finding trust in these networks; these
take as input a bipartite graph of sources and claims, with edges connecting each source to the claims
it asserts, and output a trustworthiness score for each source and a belief score for each claim (with
the semantics of these scores varying with the particular algorithm). We will discuss these at length
in Chapter 4; a straightforward example is TruthFinder [85, 86], though some reputation systems
(like Hubs and Authorities [49]) can be adapted to heterogeneous networks with relatively little
effort.
One important observation is that, regardless of the algorithm, we can readily standardize the
believability of each claim as the probability that the claim is true. However, source trustworthi-
ness scores are computed differently from algorithm to algorithm, and the most immediate choice,
used by TruthFinder and others, is to calculate this as the probability of the source producing a
true claim (the arithmetic mean of the probabilities of the claims made by the source) a measure
which, as already discussed, is readily misled. While the trustworthiness score remains an internal
parameter within the trust system, we can nonetheless report a more meaningful trustworthiness
evaluation using our own metrics, which (among other advantages) provide consistency by virtue
of being derived directly from the (standardized) belief in the claims rather than the arbitrary
trustworthiness score used by each particular algorithm.
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3.4 The Metrics
3.4.1 The Components of Trustworthiness
Besides inconsistent and problematic semantics, existing scalar trust scores for information sources
suffer from being overly broad–trustworthiness cannot always be summarized with a single number.
Consider, for example, two news articles about a topic, both of which consist of entirely true
claims. One article may omit a number of important details, while the other may be strongly
biased towards one position. A human reader interested in only the gist of the topic would be
satisfied by the incomplete article, while an information extraction system building a knowledge
base would not take bias into account.
We therefore view the trustworthiness of an information source as three interrelated, but sepa-
rate, [0, 1] components: truthfulness, completeness, and bias. This has a number of advantages for
information consumers:
• It allows them to moderate their reading by factoring in the source’s inaccuracy, incomplete-
ness or bias (and, for example, questioning claims from a somewhat inaccurate source, or
carefully maintaining objectivity when confronted with a biased source).
• They can select information sources appropriate to their needs: completeness and bias may
not be important to every user.
• Similarly, when a single score is preferred as a “summary” of a source’s trustworthiness, this
can be computed from the truthfulness, completeness and bias with respect the user’s needs.
• Each component may be explained separately to the user: a low truthfulness score is explained
by inaccurate claims, low completeness by listing some of the important claims the source does
not mention, and bias by listing claims supporting the source’s favored position together with
a list of counterpoint claims they omitted.
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3.4.2 Truthfulness
Given a single, atomic assertion, truthfulness is simply our belief in the claim; that is, T (c) = P (c).
For simplicity we restrict ourselves to Bayesian belief, but our definitions may readily be extended
to Dempster-Shafer or subjective logic, allowing us to qualify our belief with the ignorance or




c∈C P (c) · I(c, P (c))∑
c∈C I(c, P (c))
where I(c, P (c)) is the subjective importance of a claim given its truth, as determined by the
user. Declaring “Dewey Defeats Truman” is more significant than an error reporting the price of
corn futures–unless the user happens to be a futures trader. The truth of a claim also affects its
importance; e.g. given the claim “tech stocks will be highly volatile over the next five years”, an
investor would be indifferent to this claim if true (since it is in line with market expectations) but
would definitely want to know if it was false (since it would mean the risk penalty incorporated
into the price of these stocks is undeserved).
3.4.3 Completeness
We are also concerned with how thorough collections of claims (and their providers) are: a reporter
who reports the military casualties of a battle but ignores civilian losses cannot be trusted as a
source of information about the war. While incompleteness is often symptomatic of bias, this is not
always the case—it is possible to provide an incomplete view on a topic without attempting to sway
the reader to a particular position. If a collection C purports to cover a topic t (e.g. “the war”),




c∈C P (c) · I(c, P (c)) · R(c, t)∑
c∈A P (c) · I(c, P (c)) · R(c, t)
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where R(c, t) is the [0, 1] relevance of a given claim c to the topic t. Thus, completeness is the
proportion of the topic’s true, importance- and relevance-weighted claims in a given collection. A
collection that omits true, important and highly relevant claims will have a low completeness, but
omitting untrue, unimportant or irrelevant claims will have no effect.
3.4.4 Bias
Bias results from supporting a favored position with either untruthful statements or a targeted
incompleteness (“lies of omission”). A single claim may also have bias depending on its represen-
tation; e.g. “freedom fighter” and “terrorist” can refer to the same person, but with very different
connotations. Like truthfulness and completeness, the degree of bias depends on the user—a politi-
cal conservative, for example, may find Fox News less biased than MSNBC, with the converse being
true for a liberal. Here we will restrict ourselves to considering a finite, discrete set S of possible
positions for the topic (e.g. pro- and anti-gun control), where S(c, s) is the [0, 1] degree to which a
claim c supports a position s ∈ S, and ∑s∈S S(c, s) ≤ 1. Let us also denote the user’s support for
each position as S(s), where ∑s∈S S(s) = 1. Now we can calculate the bias of a single claim c and









c∈C P (c) · I(c, P (c)) · (S(s)− S(c, s))|∑
c∈C P (c) · I(c, P (c)) ·
∑
s∈S S(c, s)
A collection of claims that, on the whole, matches the user’s belief among the possible positions
thus has no bias, whereas a collection whose claims, on the whole, contradict the user’s stance is
held to have high bias. Notice that a collection need not contain claims that each match the user’s
belief in the positions to to be considered unbiased, but rather must be balanced so that, taken
together (and weighted by truth and importance) these claims collectively support each position to
the same degree the user does.
28
3.4.5 From Collections to Sources
From our metrics over single-topic collections of claims such as documents, we can calculate of




C∈PW(C) , where W is the relative weight of each constituent collection (e.g. the
importance of the collection’s topic t to the user), and X is the measure of interest (T , C, or B).
3.4.6 Relativity
Notice that we rely upon the subjective importance of claims to the user, as well as his stance
on the positions of each topic. Trustworthiness cannot be assessed “globally”, but—as we have
seen—must be calculated with respect to each user’s viewpoint to be meaningful. When evaluating
the performance of an algorithm relative to the user’s judgment, we have two choices: solicit the
user’s estimates of S(s) and I(c, T (c)), or obtain his opinion of the truthfulness, completeness and
bias of each collection directly; the former method is generally more tedious, but better suited to
large datasets where many collections share relatively few claims and topics.
3.5 User Study
We wished to explore our new metrics, and specifically to contrast our new trust metrics with
the simplistic trustworthiness scores calculated by existing trust systems, such as the arithmetic
mean (Tm(C) = |C|−1
∑
c∈C P (c)). To do this, we needed to evaluate these alternatives relative to
human trustworthiness judgments over a given collection of claims.
3.5.1 The Article
We selected a news article from the English version of The People’s Daily on the topic of the effec-
tiveness of China’s family planning policy (commonly referred to as the “one-child policy”, although
this is an inaccurate oversimplification). The People’s Daily is of particular interest because it is
operated by the Chinese Communist Party (CPC) and thus has a definite bias and yet tends to
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be factually accurate. Consequently, we could expect Tm to perform poorly as a trustworthiness
measure, as it is oblivious to bias and completeness and would award high trustworthiness scores
to both the articles and The People’s Daily on the whole, compared to the lower trustworthiness
assessment we expected humans to assign. The title of the article is itself highly suggestive of
this: “China’s population policy draws wide praise”, and its contents unsurprisingly highlight the
purported benefits of 30 years of China’s family planning policy to the Chinese people. Predictably,
it completely ignores the large body of criticism that has been leveled at the policy, including accu-
sations of forced abortions and infanticide, as well as unintended consequences such as sex-selective
abortion and the resultant male to female gender imbalance.
3.5.2 Setup
Each user in our study was given the text of the news article, but not its title, author or publisher
to prevent this from prejudicing their trust assessments. We asked that they read the article while
keeping the two possible positions (“China’s family planning policy has been good for China” and
“China’s family planning policy has been bad for China”) in mind. We then gave them a set of
questions, one regarding their own position on the topic (expressed as a real value between the
extremes of “China’s family planning policy has been entirely bad for China” and “China’s family
planning policy has been entirely good for China”), six on their assessment of the article’s overall
trustworthiness, and 57 questions about 19 specific claims made by the article (3 for each claim). All
answers were in the form of real numbers between 0 and 10 (inclusive). We had nine participants,
all computer scientists.
3.5.3 Overall Trustworthiness Assessments
The overall trustworthiness assessments given by respondents are summarized in Table 3.1. A
number of interesting observations can be made based on these results:
• Participants on the whole felt that China’s family planning policy was only mildly positive
for China, though nobody thought very negatively about it.
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Table 3.1: Survey results on the overall trustworthiness of the article
Question Min Max Mean Std Dev
What is your position on China’s family planning policy? 4 8 6.1 3.9
0 = entirely bad for China
10 = entirely good for China
How trustworthy is this article as a source of information 5 10 7.4 5.2
about the topic?
0 = completely untrustworthy
10 = completely trustworthy
How reliable is this article as a source of information about 5 9 7.6 4.3
the topic?
0 = completely unreliable
10 = completely reliable
How would you rate this article as a source of information 3 8 6.1 4.3
about the topic?
0 = worst possible article
10 = best possible article
How accurate was the information in the article? 5 9 7.2 4.6
0 = completely incorrect
10 = completely correct
How informative was the article with respect to the topic? 3 8 6.0 5.1
0 = wholly uninformative
10 = everything I needed to know
How biased was the article? 7 10 8.7 3.8
0 = completely objective
10 = completely biased
• Participants gave similar trustworthiness and reliability scores, suggesting that these two
concepts are roughly synonymous for users, although there was greater variance in the assessed
trustworthiness.
• By contrast, when asked to assign a rating to the article, respondents were significantly less
positive in their appraisal. This suggests that the criteria for overall rating differs from that for
trustworthiness, possibly including additional factors such as writing style or placing greater
emphasis on bias, or, more generally, that the perception of trustworthiness can exceed that
of quality.
• Interestingly, the mean score for trustworthiness exceeded that for accuracy (truthfulness),
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informativeness (completeness), and unbiasedness (1 - bias), suggesting that users may be
more generous in their assessment of overall trustworthiness than they are in its specific
components.
• The perceived high bias did not seem to preclude a reasonable overall trustworthiness; this
may indicate that the participants (highly educated computer scientists) consider themselves
savvy enough to correct for bias themselves, or it may be an artifact of the survey’s phrasing—
asking how trustworthy the article is “as a source of information about the topic” may have
implied that only the quantity and accuracy of the information, and not its bias, was to be
considered.
3.5.4 The Claims
From the news article we extracted 19 claims, ranging from unimportant details (“Carl Haub is
a senior demographer at the Population Reference Bureau”) to broad claims that directly address
the topic (“China’s family planning policy has alleviated problems from overpopulation in China”).
For each claim, we asked three questions:
1. To what degree do you believe this claim [0 = definitely not true, 10 = definitely true]?
2. How important would it be to you if this claim were true [0 = I wouldn’t care at all, 10 = I
would care a lot]?
3. How important would it be to you if this claim were false [0 = I wouldn’t care at all, 10 = I
would care a lot]?
Question 1 essentially asks for the user’s estimate of the probability of the claim, P(c). The
answers to questions 2 and 3 (A2 and A3) allow us to estimate I(c, P (c)) as P (c)·A2/10+(1−P (c))·
A3/10. We found respondents gave somewhat similar answers for these two questions (the mean
difference was 1.2), although for the claim “China is the most populous country in the world” the
difference was relatively large (means of 4.4 and 7.6, respectively) reflecting the value of a surprising
contradiction of the user’s expectations: if this claim were false, it would mean that a large number
of trusted sources of information (such as major mass media outlets and textbook publishers) had
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been incorrect.
When we researched these 19 claims ourselves, we found sixteen to be true with high certainty.
The remaining three claims were speculative (such as “India’s population will surpass China’s in
2040”) and found to be reasonable, but obviously not provable. This suggests a mean accuracy of at
least 84%, which would then also be the minimum Tm simple trust score reported by a trust system
(assuming it determined the truth of the claims correctly). Our survey respondents, however,
were limited to their existing background knowledge and the article itself, and did not conduct
any additional research before making their accuracy assessment. Consequently, their average
estimate of the claims’ accuracy is a significantly lower 75% (7.5/10), reflecting their greater level
of uncertainty.
3.5.5 Calculated Metrics
We estimated R(c, t) and S(c, s) for each claim, and, taken together with the surveyed values for
P (c) and I(c, P (c)), we are able to calculate the truthfulness and bias of the document for each
participant. Computing completeness, on the other hand, is not possible since we are looking at a
single document rather than a corpus, and thus do not have A and do not know which claims we
are missing. The question on informativeness instead captured this from the users directly, giving
the article a mean of 6.0, which at first seems rather generous given the brevity and one-sidedness
of the article. However, as respondents did not, on the whole, have a strong interest in China’s
family planning policies, only the broad details were important to them, and thus an absence of
detail need not necessitate a low completeness.
We calculate a truthfulness of 0.77 and a bias of 0.58. The slightly higher truthfulness versus
the simple mean accuracy of the respondents’ claim beliefs (0.75) indicates that users were more
confident in the truth value of those claims which were more important to them. Unfortunately, as
the article is consistently factually accurate, there is little room for differentiation between these
two measures here; a more interesting example would be an article that gets the important claims
correct but fine details wrong. Our calculated bias, however, is much lower than than the bias
assigned by the respondents, 0.87 (8.7/10). In this particular article, the coverage is clearly and
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uniformly one-sided, but our bias measure assumes that participants will perceive less bias when a
collection of claims (on the whole) agrees with their position on the topic. This is reasonable when
the bias level is moderate and somewhat subtle (e.g. in MSNBC and Fox News) but apparently
does not hold when bias is extreme and blatant, as the user can no longer “ignore” it. Interestingly,
when we calculate an “absolute” bias, setting S(s) = 1/|S|, we find a bias of 0.82, which is much
more in line with our users judgement. This suggests, perhaps, that when absolute bias is high, it
should be preferred to (or interpolated with) relative bias.
3.5.6 User Metric Preference
After conducting the survey and calculating our metrics, we wanted to know which trustworthiness
scores users would actually prefer in practice: our new metric triple, or a scalar rating. The
exact question we asked our survey participants was “which of these do you think best capture
the trustworthiness of the article you read in the survey (i.e. which set of metrics would be most
helpful to you if you were researching China’s family planning policy and were considering reading
the article)?”. We gave four choices. “The trustworthiness of the article is 7.4 (out of 10)”,
based on the mean overall trustworthiness given by the respondents, was preferred by 28%. “The
trustworthiness of the article is 8.7 (out of 10)”, selected as a moderately higher value, was preferred
by 11%. “The trustworthiness of the article is 10 (out of 10)”, based on the mean accuracy Tm
(taking the three speculative claims as true), was (predictably) preferred by 0%. Finally, the
composite “the truthfulness of the article is 7.7 (out of 10), the completeness of the article was 6 (out
of 10), and the bias of the article was 8.2 (out of 10)”, based on the calculated truthfulness, the mean
“informativeness” rating assigned by respondents, and the calculated absolute bias, respectively,
was preferred by the remaining 61% of respondents. Note that one respondent was undecided and
so split his vote between the first and last choices. Overall, our respondents preferred the new
metrics by a wide margin.
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3.6 Conclusion
We have introduced three new metrics for measuring the trustworthiness of information sources:
truthfulness, completeness, and bias, and shown that these are able to convey a more useful and
more robust idea of how much (and in what way) an information source should be trusted than
the current practice of presenting the user with a single, trust algorithm-dependent scalar value.
By computing trustworthiness consistently across algorithms, we also enable direct cross-system
performance comparisons, and the evaluation of computed trustworthiness against human judgment.
However, as our survey shows, human perceptions of trustworthiness are not simple to capture.
Strikingly, survey participants assigned the news article a trustworthiness score that exceeded their
opinion of its accuracy, completeness, and unbiasedness! We also found that perception of bias, in
particular, was difficult to predict; the very high bias did not seem to be reflected to a significant
degree in the overall trustworthiness assessment, and could not be estimated relative to the user as
we had expected but instead required an objective estimate.
As our survey was limited in size and scope, further analysis of our metrics may be useful.
Future work should approach an entire corpus to allow calculation (or at least estimation) of the
set of all claims (A) to allow completeness to be calculated directly, should use domain experts to
ensure accurate estimates of P (c), and should include articles with varying levels of accuracy and
bias to allow for more thorough comparison.
Still, it is nonetheless already clear that predicting consistent, semantically well-defined compo-
nents of trust is a dramatic improvement; in its absence, a trust system might have assigned our
newspaper article a perfect trustworthiness score based upon its factual accuracy, completely ignor-
ing the incompleteness and bias that proved obvious to human readers. Our new metrics avoid this






The Information Age has made publishing, distributing and collecting information easier, resulting
in the exponential growth of information available to us. Databases were once ledgers written
by hand by a single person; today they can be vast stores of data agglomerated from a myriad of
disparate sources. The mass media, formerly limited to newspapers and television programs held to
strict journalistic standards, has expanded to include collaborative content such as blogs, wikis, and
message boards. Documents covering nearly every topic abound on the Internet, but the authors
are often anonymous and the accuracy uncertain.
To cope with this new abundance, we employ information retrieval to suggest documents, and
information extraction to tell us what they say, but how can we determine what we should actually
believe? Not all information sources are equally trustworthy, and simply accepting the majority
view often leads to errors: a Google search for “water runs downhill” returns 36K documents, while
”water runs uphill” yields 88K. Consequently, a diverse set of trust algorithms collectively known
as fact-finders have been proposed that iteratively calculate the belief in a claim as a function of
the trustworthiness of the information sources asserting it and the trustworthiness of a source as a
function of the belief in the claims it makes.
Fact-finders, however, ignore the wealth of additional knowledge available, such as axiomatic
(“common-sense”) and specific declarative knowledge about claims, attributes of the sources, and
the quality of the information extraction. To incorporate this knowledge, we propose a new frame-
work that both generalizes the fact-finding algorithms to admit more informative inputs and enforces
36
declarative constraints over the fact-finding process. Each of these two (orthogonal) innovations
significantly improves results both individually and in conjunction, yielding far more accurate trust
decisions than standard fact-finders on real-world data. Furthermore, by modeling the user’s prior
knowledge and beliefs, we can find subjective truth, avoiding the assumption of a non-existent
objective truth made by previous trust analysis work, often with dramatic practical benefit.
4.2 Introduction
When we consider a collection of data with various authorship, we may view it as a set of infor-
mation sources each making one or more claims. Sources often make claims that are contradictory
(“Shakespeare was born on April 26th, 1564” and “Shakespeare was born on April 23rd, 1564”)
and, even in the absence of contradiction, we have no guarantee that the sole presented claim is
true. How, then, can we know which claims to believe, and which sources to trust? The typical
approach is simple: take a vote and choose the claim provided by the largest number of sources.
However, this implicitly assumes that all sources are equally trustworthy, which is rarely the case.
A class of algorithms known as fact-finders eliminate this implausible assumption by estimating the
trustworthiness of the sources in addition to the believability of the claims. Still, fact-finders are
themselves limited by the assumption of an objective, universal “ground” truth and by blindness
to anything beyond the source-claim graph, despite the plethora of additional knowledge available.
If one author claims that Mumbai is the largest city in the world, and another claims that it is
Seoul, who do we believe? One or both authors could be intentionally lying, honestly mistaken or,
alternatively, of different viewpoints of what constitutes a “city” (the city proper? The metropolitan
area?) Even here, truth is not objective: there may be many valid definitions of “city”, but we
should believe the claim that accords with our user’s viewpoint. Rarely is the user’s or author’s
perspective explicit (e.g. an author will not fully elaborate “the largest city by metropolitan area
bounded by...”) but it is often implied (e.g. a user’s statement that “I already know the population
of city A is X, city B is Y...” implies that his definition of a city accords with these figures). A
standard fact-finder, however, knows nothing about the user’s prior knowledge and presumes instead
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to find the (frequently non-existent) objective truth that holds for everyone.
Of course, domain knowledge is not limited to specific knowledge statements such as “Los Angeles
is more populous than Wichita”, but also includes axiomatic knowledge of general rules such as
“cities usually grow over time”. We may also know something about the information sources (e.g.
“John works for the U.S. census”), the source’s own certainty in their claim (“I am 60% certain
that...”), the information extraction system’s certainty in the claim (”it is 70% certain that John
claimed he was 60% certain that...”), and the similarity between mutually exclusive claims (if John
thinks the population of a city is 1,000, he disagrees less with a claim that the population is 1,200
than a claim that it is 2,000).
Motivated by this, we introduce a framework that both generalizes fact-finding to incorporate
non-declarative source and similarity knowledge and constrains it to enforce the user’s axiomatic
and specific declarative knowledge about the claims. As these aspects are orthogonal and comple-
mentary, we introduce them separately, verifying their individual contribution to performance in the
experiments before combining them into a single system able to leverage a very broad range of rel-
evant information into making the trust decision while building upon the diversity and tractability
of existing state-of-the-art fact-finding algorithms.
4.3 Related Work
4.3.1 Theoretical
Recall from Chapter 2 that trust can be global (e.g. eBay’s feedback scores), personal (each
person has their own trust values), or situational (personal and specific to a context) [59]. Fact-
finding algorithms are based on global trust, while our framework establishes personal trust by
exploiting the user’s individual prior knowledge. Further, while our belief in a claim is decidedly
Bayesian (corresponding to the probability that the claim is true), “unknowns” (discussed later)
allow us to reason about ignorance as subjective logic [43] and Dempster-Shafer [75] do, but with
less complexity.
We are also concerned with factors that influence our trust decision beyond the simple “who
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claimed what” assertions that are the sole input to standard fact-finders, features such as the
user’s prior knowledge, the source’s popularity, the source’s grammatical correctness, and so on, as
explored by Fogg [80, 8, 28, 30, 29] and Gil & Artz [34]. These hitherto exotic factors help motivate
our trust framework’s ability to incorporate a broad spectrum of prior knowledge such that it may
be leveraged in the context of generalized, constrained fact-finding.
4.3.2 Fact-Finders
Fact-finders consider a set of sources, each of which makes a set of claims. Often, sets of claims
are mutually exclusive with one another (e.g. putative Shakespeare birth dates), and the goal of
the fact-finder is to determine which of these alternatives is correct. They do this by iteratively
calculating the trustworthiness of each source given the belief in the claims it makes, and the belief
in each claim given the trustworthiness of the sources asserting it. TruthFinder [86], for example,
calculates the trustworthiness of a source as the mean belief in its claims. Hubs and Authorities [49],
while generally considered to be a reputation-based algorithm, is also readily adapted to fact-finding
as the simple Sums algorithm. Other fact-finders enhance this basic formula. AccuVote [24, 25]
computes source dependence (where one source copies another) and gives greater credence to more
“independent” sources, while 3-Estimates [32] estimates the “difficulty” of claims in its calculation,
and correctly asserting a difficult claim (for which there is a high degree of disagreement) confers
more trustworthiness for a source than asserting something that is “obvious”. In addition to these,
we will also introduce several new fact-finding algorithms, some offering substantially improved
performance in our experiments.
4.3.3 Comparison to Other Trust Mechanisms
Reputation-based systems and trust metrics determine trust among peers, with each peer providing
recommendations (or disapproval) for other peers; this may be implicit as in PageRank [13], where
the “recommendation” is in the form of a link, or explicitly, as in Advogato [53]. Reputation
algorithms thus tend to focus on the transitivity of these recommendations, whereas fact-finders
specify the relationship between sources and claims and derive their graph structure from corpora.
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Table 4.1: Symbols and their descriptions
Symbol Meaning
s An information source
c A claim
S The set of all sources
Cs The set of claims asserted by s ∈ S
Sc The set of sources asserting c ∈ C
C =
⋃
s∈S Cs The set of all claims
Mc ⊆ C The mutual exclusion set of c
T i(s) Trustworthiness of source s in iteration i
Bi(c) Belief in claim c in iteration i
Wikitrust [1, 2] and [89] are similarly “content-based” and corpus-driven, but these approaches are
specialized to wikis and lack the broader applicability of fact-finders. Lastly, data fusion systems
address conflicting claims within a database (e.g. [11] and [19, 18]) by examining the provenance
(chain of custody) of the data–data that has passed through the hands of trusted agents is more
believable than data that has been filtered through one or more less trustworthy agents; in most
domains, however, we only know the immediate source of a claim (who said it to us) and not the
full provenance, limiting the utility of these approaches.
4.4 Fact-Finding
Before we discuss generalized fact-finding, we describe the standard fact-finding algorithm. We
have a set of sources, S, a set of claims C, the claims Cs asserted by each source s ∈ S, and
the set of sources Sc asserting each claim c ∈ C. The sources and claims can be viewed as a
bipartite graph, where an edge exists between s and c if c ∈ Cs. In each iteration i, we estimate
the trustworthiness T i(s) of each source s given Bi−1(Cs), the belief in the claims it asserts, and
estimates the belief Bi(c) in each claim c given T i(Sc), the trustworthiness of the sources asserting
it, continuing until convergence or a stop condition. Note that “trustworthiness” and “belief” as
used within a fact-finding algorithm typically do not have well-defined semantics (e.g. they are not
[0, 1] probabilities). An initial set of beliefs, B0(C), serve as priors for each algorithm; these are
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M1 M2
Figure 4.1: A small fact-finding problem with five sources, and five claims in two mutual exclusion
sets, M1 and M2. Edges link each source to the claims it asserts. The fact-finding algorithm
alternates between updating the trustworthiness of each source given the belief in the claims it
asserts and the belief in each claim given the trustworthiness of the sources asserting it.
detailed in the next section. Notice that any fact-finder can be specified with just three things: a
trustworthiness function T (s), a belief function B(c), and the set of priors B0(C).
The mutual exclusion set Mc ⊆ C is the set of claims that are mutually exclusive to one another
(e.g. putative Obama birthplaces) to which c belongs; if c is not mutually exclusive to any other
claims, Mc = {c}. For each mutual exclusion set M containing true claim c, the goal of the fact-
finder is to ensure argmaxc∈McB
f (c) = c at the final iteration f ; the reported accuracies in our
experiments are thus the percentage of mutual exclusion sets we correctly predict over, discounting
cases where this is trivial (|M | = 1) or no correct claim is present (c /∈M).
4.4.1 Priors
Except for 3-Estimates (where the priors are dictated by the algorithm itself), every fact-finder
requires priors for B0(C). We chose from B0voted(c) = |Sc|/
∑




We consider Sums (Hubs and Authorities), TruthFinder, and 3-Estimates. Additionally, we intro-
duce three novel fact-finders that proved to be highly competitive in our experiments: Average-Log,
Investment, and PooledInvestment.
Sums (Hubs and Authorities)
Hubs and Authorities [49] gives each page a hub score and an authority score, where its hub score
is the sum of the authority of linked pages and its authority is the sum of the hub scores of pages
linking to it. This is adapted to fact-finding by viewing sources as hubs (with 0 authority) and








We normalize to prevent T i(s) and Bi(c) from growing unbounded (dividing by maxs T
i(s) and
maxcB
i(c), respectively), a technique also used with the Investment and Average·Log algorithms
(discussed next); this avoids numerical overflow. B0fixed priors are used.
Average·Log
Computing T (s) as an average of belief in its claims overestimates the trustworthiness of a source
with relatively few claims; certainly a source with 90% accuracy over a hundred examples is more
trustworthy than a source with 90% accuracy over ten. However, summing the belief in claims
allows a source with 10% accuracy to obtain a high trustworthiness score by simply making many
claims. Average·Log attempts a compromise, while still using Sums’ Bi update rule and B0fixed
priors.







In the Investment algorithm, sources “invest” their trustworthiness uniformly among their claims.
The belief in each claim then grows according to a non-linear function G, and a source’s trust-
worthiness is calculated as the sum of the beliefs in their claims, weighted by the proportion of
trust previously contributed to each (relative to the other investors). Since claims with higher-trust
sources get higher belief, these claims become relatively more believed and their sources become


















Like Investment, sources uniformly invest their trustworthiness in claims and obtain corresponding
returns, so T i(s) remains the same, but now after the belief in the claims of mutual exclusion set
M have grown according to G, they are linearly scaled such that the total belief of the claims in M
remains the same as it was before applying G(x) = xg, with g = 1.4 and B0uniform priors used in




|Cs| , we have:




TruthFinder [86] is pseudoprobabilistic: the basic version of the algorithm below calculates the
“probability” of a claim by assuming that each source’s trustworthiness is the probability of it
being correct and then averages claim beliefs to obtain trustworthiness scores. We also used the
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3-Estimates [32], also omitted for brevity, differs from the other fact-finders by adding a third set
of parameters to capture the “difficulty” of a claim, such that correctly asserting a difficult claim
confers more trustworthiness than asserting an easy one; knowing the exact population of a city
is harder than knowing the population of Mars (presumably 0) and we should not trust a source
merely because they provide what is already common knowledge.
4.5 Generalized Fact-Finding
The key technical idea behind generalized fact-finding is that we can quite elegantly encode a variety
of prior knowledge by replacing the bipartite graph of standard fact-finders with a new weighted k-
partite graph, transitioning from binary assertions to weighted ones (“source s claims c with weight
x”) and adding additional “layers” of nodes to the graph to represent source groups and attributes.
We then need only modify the fact-finding algorithms to function on this new graph.
4.5.1 Encoding Information in Weighted Assertions
Weighted assertions, where each source s asserts a claim c with weight ω(s, c) = [0, 1], allow us to
incorporate a variety of factors into the model:
• Uncertainty in information extraction: we have a [0, 1] probability that source s asserted claim
c.
• Uncertainty of the source: a source may qualify his assertion (“I’m 90% certain that...”)
• Similarity between claims: a source asserting one claim also implicitly asserts (to a degree)
similar claims.
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• Group membership: the other members of the groups to which a source belongs implicitly
support (to a degree) his claims.
We separately calculate ωu for uncertainty in information in extraction, ωp for uncertainty
expressed by the source, ωσ for the source’s implicit assertion of similar claims, and ωg for a source’s
implicit assertion of claims made by the other members of the groups to which he belongs. These
are orthogonal, allowing us to calculate the final assertion weight ω(s, c) as: ωu(s, c) × ωp(s, c) +
ωσ(s, c) + ωg(s, c). Here, ωu(s, c) × ωp(s, c) can be seen as our expectation of the [0, 1] belief the
source s has in claim c given the possibility of an error in information extraction, while ωσ(s, c) and
ωg(s, c) redistribute weight based on claim similarity and source group membership, respectively.
Uncertainty in Information Extraction
The information extractor may be uncertain whether an assertion occurs in a document due to
intrinsic ambiguities in the document or error from the information extractor itself (e.g. an optical
character recognition mistake, an unknown verb, etc.); in either case, the weight is given by the
probability ωu(s, c) = P (s→ c).
Uncertainty of the Source
Alternatively, the source himself may be unsure. This may be specific (“I am 60% certain that
Obama was born in...”) or vague (“I am pretty sure that...”); in the latter case, we assume that
the information extractor will assign a numerical certainty for us, so that in either event we have
ωp(s, c) = Ps(c), where Ps(c) is the estimate provided by source s of the probability of claim c.
Similarity Between Claims
Oftentimes a meaningful similarity function exists among the claims in a mutual exclusion set. For
example, when comparing two possible birthdays for Obama, we can calculate their similarity as
the inverse of the time between them, e.g. |days(date1)−days(date2)|−1 (where days measures the
number of days relative to an arbitrary reference date). A source claiming date1 then also claims
date2 with a weight proportional to this degree of similarity, the idea being that while date2 is not
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what he claimed, he will prefer it over other dates that are even more dissimilar. Given a [0, 1]




ωu(s, d)ωp(s, d)σ(c, d)
Notice that a self-consistent source will not assert multiple claims in mutual exclusion set M
with
∑
c∈M ωu(s, c)ωp(s, c) > 1, and thus the addition of ωσ(s, c) to ω(s, c) will never result in
ω(s, c) > 1; it is possible, however, that
∑
c∈M ω(s, c) > 1 for a given source s. One way to avoid
this is to redistribute weight rather than add it; we introduce the parameter α to control the degree
of redistribution and obtain:




αωu(s, d)ωp(s, d)σ(c, d)∑
e∈Md,e6=d σ(d, e)
)
− αωu(s, c)ωp(s, c)
This function ensures that only a portion α of the source’s expected belief in the claim,
ωu(s, c)ωp(s, c), is redistributed among other claims in Mc (proportional to their similarity with c),
at a cost of αωu(s, c)ωp(s, c).
[86] previously used a form of additive similarity as “Implication” functions in TruthFinder;
however, our formalization generalizes this idea and allows us to apply it to any fact-finder.
Group Membership via Weighted Assertions
Oftentimes a source belongs to one or more groups; for example, a journalist may be a member of
professional associations and an employee of one or more publishers. Our assumption is that these
groups are meaningful, that is, sources belonging to the same group tend to have similar degrees of
trustworthiness. A prestigious, well-known group (e.g. the group of administrators in Wikipedia)
will presumably have more trustworthy members (in general) than a discredited group (e.g. the
group of blocked Wikipedia editors). The approach discussed in this section encodes these groups
using ωg; a more flexible approach, discussed later, is to use additional “layers” of groups and
attributes instead.
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Let Gs be the set of groups to which a source s belongs. If a source s and source u are both
members of the same group g, we interpret this as an implicit assertion by u in Cs, and by s in Cu—
that is, group members mutually assert each others’ claims to a degree. We use a redistribution
parameter β such that the original weight of a member’s assertion is split between the member
(proportional to 1− β) and the other members of the groups to which he belongs (proportional to
β). This gives us:





ωu(u, c)ωp(u, c) + ωσ(u, c)
|Gu| · |Gs| ·
∑
v∈g |Gv|−1
− β(ωu(s, c)ωp(s, c) + ωσ(s, c))
∑
v∈g |Gv|−1 in the denominator gives greater credence to “small” groups (where members
belonging to many other groups weigh less heavily), with the intuition that smaller groups have
more similar members. Note that in the worst case (where all sources belong to a single group and
each assert a unique set of k claims) this can effectively create as many as (k · |S|)2 − k · |S| new
assertions, with a corresponding increase in computational cost when running the fact-finder.
4.5.2 Rewriting Fact-Finders for Assertion Weights
After calculating the weight functions ω(s, c) for all s ∈ S and c ∈ C, we need to rewrite each
fact-finder’s T (s), B(c) and B0(c) functions to use these weights in the generalized fact-finding
process by qualifying previously “whole” assertions as “partial”, weighted assertions. We start by
redefining Sc as {s : s ∈ S, ω(s, c) > 0}, and Cs as {c : c ∈ C,ω(s, c) > 0}. The basic rewriting
rules are:
• Replace |Sc| with
∑
s∈Sc ω(s, c)
• Replace |Cs| with
∑
c∈Cs ω(s, c)
• In T i(s), replace Bi−1(c) with ω(s, c)Bi−1(c)
• In Bi(c), replace T i(s) with ω(s, c)T i(s)
These rules suffice for all the linear fact-finders we encountered; one, TruthFinder, is instead log-
linear, so an exponent rather than a coefficient is applied, but such exceptions are straightforward.
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Average·Log employs the same B function as Sums, so we provide only the trustworthiness function:











The Investment algorithm requires sources to “invest” their trust uniformly in their claims; we

















PooledInvestment utilizes the same T i(s) function as Investment, and instead alters the belief










TruthFinder [86] has both a “simple” and “complete” version, with the latter making a number
of adjustments to the former. We specify only the simple version below, as the modifications to
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Figure 4.2: A fact-finding problem with a single group layer. Edges between sources and groups
denote membership.
the complete variant are similar. Both models calculate claim belief non-linearly, and in either
case we have the option of using logarithms to obtain a log-linear function. This is what we do in
practice, since it avoids underflow in the floating-point variables; for clarity, however, we present
the “multiplicative” version below. Note that using ω(s, c) as an exponent here is equivalent to its












3-Estimates [32] incorporates an additional set of parameters to model the “hardness” of each
claim (referred to as ε(F)) that can be incorporated into the B and T functions to fit our common
model. We omit the full algorithm here for brevity, but generalizing it is quite straightforward–
when calculating a summation over sources for a given claim or a summation over claims for a
given source, we simply weight each element of the sum by the relevant assertion weight between
the particular source and claim in question.
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4.5.3 Groups and Attributes as Layers
Instead of using weighted assertions, we can add additional “layers” to represent groups and at-
tributes directly. Each node in these layers will represent a group or attribute, with edges linking
to its adjoining layers (either the sources or other groups/attributes), creating a k-partite graph
(with k > 3 used to encode meta-groups and meta-attributes.) An standard fact-finder iteratively
alternates between calculating the first layer (the claims) and the second layer (the sources), using
the B and T functions, respectively. Now we replace these with generic “up” and “down” functions
for each layer. For a k-partite graph with layers L1...k, we define U
i
j(Lj) over j = 2...k and D
i
j(Lj)
over j = 1...k − 1, with special cases U i1(L1) = Di−11 (L1) and Dik(Lk) = U ik(Lk). The Uj and Dj
functions may differ for each j, or they may be the same over all layers. In each iteration i, we
calculate the values U ij(Lj) for layers j = 2 to k, and then calculate D
i
j(Lj) for layers j = k − 1 to









Where ω(e, f) = ω(f, e) is the edge weight between nodes e and f ; if e or f is a group or
attribute, ω(e, f) is 1 if e has attribute or group f or vice-versa, and 0 otherwise. In many cases,
though, we may benefit from using an existing fact-finder over the claim and source layers, while
using a different set of functions to mediate the interaction between the source and group/attribute
layers. In particular, an information bottleneck often exists when calculating trustworthiness of a
source in the “down phase”, as it will be wholly dependent upon the trustworthiness of the groups to
which it belongs: a source belonging to one overall-mediocre group may make many correct claims,
but still be assigned a low trustworthiness score by the D function because of its group membership.
This type of problem can be resolved by incorporating both the layer below and the layer above
in each calculation; for example, for a given Dj(e), we can define ωchildren =
∑
f∈Lj−1 ω(e, f) and
Dsmoothj (e) = (1 + ωchildren)
−1Dj(e) + ωchildren(1 + ωchildren)−1Uj(e), which returns a mixture
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Figure 4.3: Use of additional layers to model specialization of the source s1 into two categories,
biology and physics, and four subcategories (cellular biology, ecology, astronomy and classical
mechanics), each containing a single claim made by the source. The dotted lines connect to the
same subcategories of other sources (not shown) making the same claims. See text for details.
of the value derived from e’s ancestors, Dj(e) and the value derived from e’s descendants, Uj(e),
according to the (weighted) number of children e possesses, the intuition being that with more
children Uj(e) is more certain and should be weighted more highly, whereas with fewer children we
should depend more upon our ancestors. We will use Dsmoothj (e) in our experiments.
Source Domain Expertise
The idea of incorporating the domain expertise of the source into the trust decision has been around
at least as far back as Marsh’s 1994 thesis [59] and, in our generalized fact-finding framework, we
can model it using the same techniques we used to model groups. For example, we expect a plant
biologist to be more trustworthy on topics such as photosynthesis and genetic engineering, but less
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reliable on topics outside his expertise, such as fusion and computational complexity. Still, these
aspects are not entirely separate: if we have two plant biologists A and B, and A gives accurate
information about plant biology while B gives inaccurate information, we will tend to assign greater
credence to A with respect to other domains (such as physics) as well–that is, we assume A is more
“generally trustworthy” overall.
To implement this, we may create additional layers to represent our trustworthiness in a source
for various domains. In Figure 4.3, we see that source s1 has made claims in four different domains:
cellular biology, ecology, astronomy, and classical mechanics. Each node shown in layers 2 and 3
is specific to s1, representing his trustworthiness in that particular field or subfield, such that the
sources are actually s1’s “Cellular”, “Ecology”, “Astro” and “Classic” nodes, which belong to two
groups corresponding to s1’s biology and physics trustworthiness, which themselves belong to a
metagroup corresponding to s1’s general trustworthiness.
Additional Layers versus Weighted Edges
Relative to adding edges to represent groups, expanding our model with additional layers increases
the complexity of the algorithm, but prevents the quadratic expansion of the number of edges and
corresponding increase in time complexity. More importantly, though, the flexibility in specifying
the U and D functions for high layers representing groups and attributes allows us to augment an
existing fact-finder to take advantage of this additional information in an arbitrary way.
4.6 Constrained Fact-Finding
To apply the user’s specific and axiomatic “common-sense” declarative prior knowledge over claims
to a fact-finding algorithm, we translate it into a linear program. We then iterate the following
until convergence or other stopping criteria:
1. Compute T i(s) for all s ∈ S
2. Compute Bi(c) for all c ∈ C
3. “Correct” beliefs Bi(C) with the LP
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4.6.1 Propositional Linear Programming
To translate declarative prior knowledge into a linear program, we first propositionalize our first-
order formulae into propositional logic [72]. For example, assume we know that Tom is older than
John and a person has exactly one age (∃x,yAge(Tom, x)∧Age(John, y)∧x > y)∧(∀x,y,zAge(x, y)∧
y 6= z ⇒ ¬Age(x, z)), and we are considering the following claims: Age(Tom, 30), Age(Tom, 40),
Age(John, 25), Age(John, 35). Our propositional clauses (after removing redundancies) are then
Age(Tom, 30)⇒ Age(John, 25)∧(Age(Tom, 30)⊕Age(Tom, 40))∧(Age(John, 25)⊕Age(John, 35)).
Each claim c will be represented by a proposition, and ultimately a [0, 1] variable in the linear
program corresponding informally to P (c).1 Propositionalized constraints have previously been used
with integer linear programming (ILP) using binary {0, 1} values corresponding to {false, true}
to find an (exact) consistent truth assignment minimizing some cost and solving a global inference
problem, e.g. [70, 69]. However, propositional linear programming has two significant advantages:
1. ILP is “winner take all”, shifting all belief to one claim in each mutual exclusion set (even
when other claims are nearly as plausible) and finding the single most believable consistent
binary assignment ; we instead wish to find a distribution of belief over the claims that is
consistent with our prior knowledge and as close as possible to the distribution produced by
the fact-finder.
2. Linear programs can be solved in polynomial time (e.g. by interior point methods [47]), but
ILP is NP-hard.
To create our constraints, we first convert our propositional formula into conjunctive normal
form. Then, for each disjunctive clause consisting of a set P of positive literals (claims) and a set N




c∈N (1− cv) ≥ 1, where cv denotes the
[0, 1] variable corresponding to each c. The left-hand side is the union bound of at least one of the
claims being true (or false, in the case of negated literals); if this bound is at least 1, the constraint is
satisfied. This optimism can dilute the strength of our constraints by ignoring potential dependence
among claims: x ⇒ y, x ∨ y implies y is true, but since we demand only yv ≥ xv and xv + yv ≥ 1
1This is a slight mischaracterization, since our linear constraints only approximate intersections and unions of
events (where each event is “claim c is true”), and we will be satisfying them subject to a linear cost function.
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we accept any yv ≥ 0.5 where yv ≥ xv ≥ 1− yv. However, when the claims are mutually exclusive,
the union bound is exact; a common constraint is of the form q ⇒ r1 ∨ r2 ∨ . . ., where the r literals
are mutually exclusive, which translates exactly to r1v + r
2
v + . . . ≥ qv. Finally, observe that mutual
exclusion amongst n claims c1, c2, . . ., cn can be compactly written as c1v + c
2
v + . . .+ c
n
v = 1.
4.6.2 The Cost Function
Having seen how first-order logic can be converted to linear constraints, we now consider the cost
function, a distance between the new distribution of belief satisfying our constraints and the original
distribution produced by the fact-finder.
First we determine the number of “votes” received by each claim c, computed as ωc = ω(B(c)),
which should scale linearly with the certainty of the fact-finder’s belief in c. Recall that the semantics
of the belief score are particular to the fact-finder, so different fact-finders require different vote
functions. TruthFinder has pseudoprobabilistic [0,1] beliefs, so we use ωinv(x) = min((1−x)-1,minv)
with minv = 10
10 limiting the maximum number of votes possible; we assume 1/0 = ∞. ωinv
intuitively scales with “error”: a belief of 0.99 receives ten times the votes of 0.9 and has a tenth
the error (0.01 vs. 0.1). For the remainder of the fact-finders whose beliefs are already “linear”, we
use the identity function ωidn(x) = x.
The most obvious choice for the cost function to minimize might be “frustrated votes”, computed
as
∑
c∈C ωc(1 − cv). Unfortunately, this results in the linear solver generally assigning 1 to the
variable in each mutual exclusion set with the most votes and 0 to all others (except when constraints
prevent this), shifting all belief to the highest-vote claim and yielding poor performance. Instead,
we wish to satisfy the constraints while keeping each cv close to ωc/ωMc , where ωMc =
∑
d∈Mc ωd,
and thus shift belief among claims as little as possible. We use a weighted Manhattan distance
called VoteDistance, where the cost for increasing the belief in a claim is proportional to the






 (ωMc − ωc) · (cv − ωc/ωMc),
ωc · (ωc/ωMc − cv)

Thus, the belief distribution found by our LP will be the one that satisfies the constraints while
simultaneously minimizing the number of votes frustrated by the change from the original distri-
bution. Note that for any linear expressions e and f we can implement max(e, f) in the objective
function by replacing it with a new [−∞,∞] helper variable x and adding the linear constraints
x ≥ e and x ≥ f .
4.6.3 From Values to Votes to Belief
Solving the LP gives us [0, 1] values for each variable cv, but we need to calculate an updated belief
B(c). We propose two methods for this:
Vote Conservation: B(c) = ω−1(cv · ωMc)
Vote Loss: B(c) = ω−1(min(ωc, cv · ωMc))
ω−1 is an inverse of the vote function: ω−1idn(x) = x and ω
−1
inv(x) = 1 − (1 + y)−1. Vote
Conservation reallocates votes such that the total number of votes in each mutual exclusion set,
ωM , remains the same after the redistribution. However, if the constraints force c to lose votes,
should we believe the other claims in Mc more? Under Vote Loss, a claim can only lose votes,
ensuring that if other claims in Mc become less believable, c does not itself become more believable
relative to claims in other mutual exclusion sets. We found Vote Loss slightly better on average
and used it for all reported results.
4.6.4 LP Decomposition
Frequently our linear programs can be decomposed into smaller problems that can be solved inde-
pendently. If there exists a subset of linear constraints L′ ⊂ L that contain a set of variables V ′ ⊂ V
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such that ∀v∈V ′,l∈L/L′ v 6∈ l, then L′ together with the terms in the cost function containing the
variables V ′ can be solved as a separate LP.
We can also reduce running time by observing that, for any such “sub-LP”, it is easy to set each
variable cv to ωc/ωMc (yielding the minimum possible cost of 0) and check if the constraints are
satisfied—if they are, the optimal solution is found without invoking the linear solver. Together,
these techniques allowed us to solve most LPs one or two orders of magnitude faster in our experi-
ments (almost always within a matter of seconds), taking more than a minute to solve on a modest
desktop machine only when the presence of tens of thousands of constraints prevented meaningful
decomposition.
4.6.5 Tie Breaking
We must also address “ties” between claims with the same number of votes. If the linear solver is
allowed to break these arbitrarily, the results may vary from solver to solver. This is of particular
concern when using a chain of solvers (our experiments used Microsoft Solver Foundation (MSF)
simplex → lp solve simplex → MSF interior point) to enable “fallback” when one solver fails and
consistent behavior is required. We handled this by, within each decomposed LP, identifying pairs
of claims with the same number of votes, multiplying the votes of one by 1 + 10−10 and repeating
until no pair of claims is tied. Which claim gets slightly boosted depends upon a “precedence” that
is assigned randomly at the start of the experiment.
4.6.6 “Unknown” Augmentation
Augmenting our data with “Unknown” claims ensures that every LP is feasible and can be used to
model our ignorance given a lack of sufficient information or conflicting constraints. An Unknown
claim UM is added to every mutual exclusion set M (but invisible to the fact-finder) and represents
our belief that none of the claims in M are sufficiently supported. Now we can write the mutual
exclusion constraint for M as UM +
∑
c∈M cv = 1. When propositionalizing FOL, if a disjunctive
clause contains a non-negated literal for a claim c, then we add ∨UMc to the clause. For example,
Age(John, 35) ⇒ Age(Tom, 40) becomes Age(John, 35) ⇒ Age(Tom, 40) ∨ Age(Tom,Unknown).
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The only exception is when the clause contains claims from only one mutual exclusion set (e.g.
“I know Sam is 50 or 60”), and so the LP can only be infeasible if the user directly asserts a
contradiction (e.g. “Sam is 50 and Sam is 60”). The Unknown itself has a fixed number of votes
that cannot be lost; this effectively “smooths” our belief in the claims and imposes a floor for
believability. If Age(Kim, 30) has 5 votes, Age(Kim, 35) has 3 votes, and Age(Kim,Unknown) is
fixed at 6 votes, we hold that Kim’s age is unknown due to lack of evidence. The number of votes
that should be given to each Unknown for this purpose depends, of course, on the particular fact-
finder and ω function used; in our experiments, we are not concerned with establishing ignorance
and thus assign 0 votes.
4.7 Experiments
To evaluate our extensions to fact-finding, both the generalization of the fact-finders themselves
and the application of declarative constraints, we experimented over a number of state-of-the-
art fact-finding algorithms using both real-world and semi-synthetic datasets. We considered both
extensions separately, finding each was independently able to improve the accuracy of trust decisions
by incorporating different types of prior knowledge into the fact-finding process, and then combined
these orthogonal components into a joint model able to achieve significantly better results than were
possible using either alone.
4.7.1 Data
We used a number of real-world datasets in our experiments, including two (Population and Biog-
raphy) extracted from Wikipedia infoboxes [83] (semi-structured tables with various fields within
Wikipedia articles). An example of an infobox for the city of Laguna Beach is shown in Figure 4.4.
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Figure 4.4: Example of a Wikipedia Infobox
Population
We collected Wikipedia infoboxes for settlements (Geobox, Infobox Settlement, Infobox City, etc.)
to obtain 44,761 population claims qualified by year (e.g. triples such as (Denver, 598707, 2008))
from 171,171 sources (“editors”, in Wikipedia parlance), with a test set of 308 “true” claims taken
from U.S. census data (omitting the many cases where editors did not contest the population, or
where all claims in Wikipedia were wrong). To allow for a direct comparison between generalized
fact-finding and declarative prior knowledge, we use the population dataset across both sets of
experiments and for the combined, joint model as well.
Books
For generalized fact-finding, we also have [86]’s Books dataset, extracted from online bookstore
websites. The Books dataset is a collection of 14,287 claims of the authorship of various books
by 894 websites, where a website asserts that a person was an author of a book (e.g. (Bronte,
“Jane Eyre”)) explicitly by including them in the list of authors, or implicitly asserts a person was
not an author (e.g. (¬Bronte, “Jane Eyre”)) by omitting them from the list (when at least one
other website lists that person as an author of the book—if nobody lists a person as an author, his
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non-authorship is not disputed and can be ignored). The test set is 605 true claims collected by
examining the books’ covers.
Biography
For our declarative prior knowledge experiments, we created the Biography dataset by scanning
Wikipedia infoboxes to find 129,847 claimed birth dates, 34,201 death dates, 10,418 parent-child
pairs, and 9,792 spouses as reported by 1,167,494 editors. To get “true” birth and death dates, we
extracted data from several online repositories (after satisfying ourselves that they were independent
and not derived from Wikipedia!), eliminating any date these sources disagreed upon, and ultimately
obtained a total of 2,685 dates to test against.
American vs. British Spelling
Finally, we examined a domain where the truth was plainly subjective and thus the user’s prior
knowledge is essential: identifying the “correct” spelling of words given 209,189 articles from the
British National Corpus, The Washington Post and Reuters written by 9,387 distinct authors.
4.7.2 Experimental Setup
For our experiments we used a number of state-of-the-art fact-finding algorithms: Sums / Hubs
and Authorities (Sum), 3-Estimates (3Est), simplified TruthFinder (TFs), “full” TruthFinder
(TFc), Average·Log (A·L), Investment with g = 1.2 (Inv1.2), and PooledInvestment with g = 1.4
(Pool1.4). The voting baseline (Vote) simply chooses the claim asserted by the most sources. The
number of iterations used for each fact-finder was fixed at 20. To evaluate accuracy, after the final
iteration we looked at each mutual exclusion set M and predicted the highest-belief claim c ∈ M
(other than uM , if applicable), breaking ties randomly, and checked if it was the true claim tM . We
omitted any M that did not contain a true claim (all known claims are false) and any M that was
trivially correct (containing only one claim [other than uM , if applicable]).
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Table 4.2: Experimental Results for Tuned Assertion Certainty. All values are percent accuracy.
Data Weights Vote Sum 3Est TFc A·L Inv1.2 Pool1.4
Pop Unweighted 81.49 81.82 81.49 84.42 80.84 87.99 80.19
Pop Tuned 81.90 82.90 82.20 87.20 83.90 90.00 80.60
Pop Best 81.82 83.44 82.47 87.66 86.04 90.26 81.49
4.7.3 Generalized Fact-Finding
Tuned Assertion Certainty
A user modifying a field of interest in an infobox (e.g. the population total field) is clearly asserting
the corresponding claim (“population = x”), but what if he edits another part of the infobox, or
somewhere else on the page? Did he also read and approve the fields containing the claims we
are interested in, implicitly asserting them? We can simply consider only direct edits of a field
containing a claim to be an assertion of that claim, but this ignores the large number of potential
assertions that may be implicit in an editor’s decision to not change the field.
This may be considered either uncertainty in information extraction (since we are not able to
extract the author’s true intent) or uncertainty on the part of the authors (an editor leaves a field
unaltered because he believes it is “probably” true). In either case, we can weight the assertions to
model this uncertainty in the generalized fact-finder. The information extractor provides a list of
all edits and their type (editing the field of interest, another field in the infobox, or elsewhere in the
document), and each type of edit implies a different certainty (a user editing another field in the
infobox is more likely to have read and approved the neighboring field of interest than a user editing
a different portion of the document), although we do not know what those levels of certainty are.
These can be discovered by tuning with a subset of the test set and evaluating on the remainder,
varying the relative weights of the “infobox”, “elsewhere”, and “field of interest” assertions. The
results are shown in Table 4.2. In the “unweighted” case only direct edits to the “field of interest”
are considered, and “infobox” and “elsewhere” edits are ignored (giving all edits equal weight fares
much worse).
We tuned over 208 randomly-chosen examples and evaluated on the remaining 100, repeating
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Table 4.3: Experimental Results for Uncertainty in Information Extraction
Data Assertions Vote Sum 3Est TFc A·L Inv1.2 Pool1.4
Pop Unweighted 71.10 77.92 71.10 78.57 76.95 78.25 74.35
Pop Generalized (Weighted) 76.95 78.25 76.95 80.19 78.90 84.09 78.25
Books Unweighted 80.63 77.93 80.74 80.56 79.21 77.83 81.20
Books Generalized (Weighted) 81.88 81.13 81.88 82.90 81.96 80.50 81.93
the experiment ten times. We also tuned (and tested) with all 308 labeled examples to get the
“Best” results, only slightly better than those from legitimate tuning. As expected, assigning a
smaller weight to the “infobox” assertions (relative to the “field of interest”) and a much lower
weight to the “elsewhere” assertions yielded the greatest results, confirming our common-sense
assumption that edits close to a field of interest confer more supervision and implicit approval than
those elsewhere on the page. We found a significant gain across all fact-finders, notably improving
the top Investment result to 90.00%, demonstrating that generalized fact-finders can dramatically
increase performance.
Uncertainty in Information Extraction
We next consider the case where the information extractor is uncertain about the putative claims,
but provides an (accurate) estimate of ωu(s, c) = P (s → c), the probability that source s made a
given claim c.
For the Population dataset, we augment each mutual exclusion set M with an additional (in-
correct) claim, ensuring |M | ≥ 2. For each assertion s → c we select another c′ ∈ Mc, and draw a
p from a Beta(4,1) distribution (E(p) = 0.8⇒ 20% chance of error). We then set ωu(s, c) = p and
ωu(s, c
′) = 1 − p. In the unweighted case (where edge weights must be 0 or 1), we keep the edge
between s and c if p ≥ 0.5, and replace that edge with one between s and c′ if p < 0.5.
For the Books dataset, each mutual exclusion set had exactly two claims (a person is either an
author of a book or he is not) and thus did not require augmentation. Here we drew p from a
Beta(2,1) distribution (E(p) = 2/3), corresponding to a greater (33%) chance of error. Our results
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Table 4.4: Experimental Results for Groups using Weighted Assertions
β Vote Sum 3Est TFc A·L Inv1.2 Pool1.4
(No groups) 81.49 81.82 81.49 84.42 80.84 87.99 80.19
0.7 84.09 84.09 84.42 85.71 84.74 84.74 83.44
0.5 83.77 84.09 84.42 85.06 84.09 87.01 82.79
0.3 82.47 83.77 83.77 84.74 83.77 87.01 82.79
0.00001 83.44 82.14 83.44 84.42 81.49 88.96 80.51
are shown in Table 4.3; on both datasets, generalized fact-finders easily outperform their standard
counterparts.
Groups as Weighted Assertions
Using the Population data we considered three groups of editors: administrators, blocked users,
and regular users with at least one template on their user page (intended to capture more serious
editors). To keep things simple, we allowed each user to belong to at most one of these groups—
if an administrator had been blocked, he nonetheless belonged to the administrator group; if an
otherwise “regular” user were blocked, he (of course) belonged to the blocked group. Given that
administrators are promoted to that position by being trusted by other Wikipedia editors, and that
blocked users are blocked by trusted administrators for (presumable) misbehavior, we expected that
administrators will be relatively trustworthy on the whole, while blocked users will be more un-
trustworthy, with serious editors somewhere in between. We then encoded these groups as weighted
assertions, using ωg with arbitrarily chosen β parameters, as shown in Table 4.4. We see improved
performance with all β values tested, with the exception of the Investment algorithm, which re-
quires a much lower β; we can conclude from this that β should be tuned independently on each
fact-finder for best results.
Groups as Additional Layers
We next took the same three groupings of editors (administrators, blocked users, and regular
users) and added them as a third layer in our generalized fact-finders, continuing to use the same
62
Table 4.5: Experimental Results for Groups as an Additional Layer
Description Sum TFc A·L Inv1.2 Inv1.2/Avg Pool1.4/Avg
No Groups 81.82 84.42 80.84 87.99 87.99 80.19
Groups 83.77 83.44 84.42 83.44 88.64 64.94
Groups (Dsmooth2 ) 84.74 84.09 82.79 88.96 89.61 84.74
Tuned + Groups 86.10 83.30 87.00 88.50 90.00 77.90
Tuned + Groups (Dsmooth2 ) 83.20 85.30 84.20 87.40 90.00 83.50
Population dataset as before. For most fact-finders, we can directly adapt the T and B functions as
U and D functions, respectively, though this excludes PooledInvestment (which depends on mutual
exclusion sets) and 3-Estimates (whose “claim difficulty” parameters are not readily extended to
groups). In the former case, we can calculate the trustworthiness of the groups in the third layer as a




2(s)/|g|, where g is
a group and |g| is the number of sources it contains. Likewise, we can calculate the trustworthiness





3(g)/|Gs|, where Gs is the set of groups to which source s belongs (recall that,
since there are three layers, Di3(g) = U
i
3(g)). We can use these new U3 and D2 functions to handle
the interaction between the group layer and the source layer, while continuing to use an existing
fact-finder to mediate the interaction between the source layer and claim layer. We apply this hybrid
approach to two fact-finders, giving us Inv1.2/Avg, and Pool1.4/Avg. Finally, note that regardless
of the choice of D2, we are discarding the trustworthiness of each source as established by its claims
in favor of the collective trustworthiness of its groups, an information bottleneck. When we have
ample claims for a source, its group membership is less important; however, when there are few
claims, group membership becomes much more important due to the lack of other “evidence”. The
previously described Dsmoothj captures this idea by scaling the impact of groups on a source by the
(weighted) number of claims made by that source. We show results both with and without this
smoothing in Table 4.5.
Except for TruthFinder, groups always improve the results, although “smoothing” may be re-
quired. We also tuned the assertion certainty as we did in Table 4.2 in conjunction with the use
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Table 4.6: Constrained Fact-Finding Results (∅ indicates no prior knowledge)
Dataset Prior Knowledge Vote Sum 3Est TFs TFc A·L Inv1.2 Pool1.4
Pop ∅ 81.49 81.82 81.49 82.79 84.42 80.84 87.99 80.19
Pop GrowthIBT 82.79 79.87 77.92 82.79 86.36 80.52 85.39 79.87
Pop GrowthL+I 82.79 79.55 77.92 83.44 85.39 80.52 89.29 80.84
Pop Larger2500IBT 85.39 85.06 80.52 86.04 87.34 84.74 89.29 84.09
Pop Larger2500L+I 85.39 85.06 80.52 86.69 86.69 84.42 89.94 84.09
SynPop ∅ 73.45 87.76 84.87 56.12 87.07 90.23 89.41 90.00
SynPop Pop±8%IBT 88.31 95.46 92.16 96.42 95.46 96.15 95.46 96.42
SynPop Pop±8%L+I 88.31 94.77 92.43 82.39 95.32 95.59 96.29 96.01
Bio ∅ 89.80 89.53 89.80 73.04 90.09 89.24 88.34 90.01
Bio CSIBT 89.20 89.61 89.20 72.44 89.91 89.35 88.60 90.20
Bio CSL+I 89.20 89.61 89.20 57.10 90.09 89.35 88.49 90.24
Bio CS+DecadesIBT 90.58 90.88 90.58 80.30 91.25 90.91 90.02 91.32
Bio CS+DecadesL+I 90.58 90.91 90.58 69.27 90.95 90.91 90.09 91.17
Spell ∅ 13.54 9.37 11.96 41.93 7.93 10.23 9.36 9.65
Spell Words100IBT 13.69 9.02 12.72 44.28 8.05 9.98 11.11 8.86
Spell Words100L+I 13.69 8.86 12.08 46.54 8.05 9.98 9.34 7.89
Spell CS+Words100IBT 35.10 31.88 35.10 56.52 29.79 32.85 73.59 80.68
Spell CS+Words100L+I 35.10 31.72 34.62 55.39 22.06 32.21 30.92 29.95
of groups; here we find no relative improvement for Investment or TruthFinder, but gain over both
tuning and groups alone for all other fact-finders.
4.7.4 Constrained Fact-Finding
IBT vs. L+I
We can enforce our declarative prior knowledge against the beliefs produced by the fact-finder in
each iteration, or we can apply these constraints just once, after running the fact-finder for 20
iterations in the standard fashion, without interleaving the enforcement of constraints. By analogy
to [67], we refer to these approaches as inference based training (IBT) and learning + inference
(L+I), respectively. Our results show that while L+I does better when prior knowledge is not
entirely correct (e.g. “Growth” in the city population domain), generally performance is comparable
when the effect of the constraints is mild, but IBT can outperform when prior knowledge is vital
(as in the spelling domain) by allowing the fact-finder to learn from the provided corrections.
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City Population
Our axiomatic “common-sense” knowledge is that population grows over time (“Growth” in table
4.6); therefore, ∀v,w,x,y,zpop(v, w, y) ∧ pop(v, x, z) ∧ y < z ⇒ x > w. Of course, this often does
not hold true: cities can shrink, but performance was nevertheless superior to no prior knowledge
whatsoever. The L+I approach does appreciably better because it avoids forcing these sometimes-
incorrect constraints onto the claim beliefs while the fact-finder iterates (which would propagate the
resulting mistakes), instead applying them only at the end where they can correct more errors than
they create. The sparsity of the data plays a role—only a fraction of cities have population claims
for multiple years, and those that do are typically larger cities where the correct claim is asserted by
an overwhelming majority, greatly limiting the potential benefit of our Growth constraints. We also
considered prior knowledge of the relative sizes of some cities, randomly selecting 2500 pairs of them
(a, b), where a was more populous than b in year t, asserting ∀x,ypop(a, x, t) ∧ pop(b, y, t)⇒ x > y.
This “Larger” prior knowledge proved more effective than our oft-mistaken Growth constraint, with
modest improvement to the highest-performing Investment fact-finder, and InvestmentL+I reaches
90.91% with 10,000 such pairs.
Synthetic City Population
As our real-world data was sparse, we created a synthetic dataset to determine how effective
common-sense knowledge would be in the presence of “dense” data. We chose 100 random (real)
cities and created 100 authors whose individual accuracy a was drawn uniformly from [0, 1]. Be-
tween 1 and 10 claims (also determined uniformly) were made about each city in each year from 2000
to 2008 by randomly-selected authors. For each city with true population p and year, four incorrect
claims were created with populations selected uniformly from [0.5p, 1.5p], each author claiming p
with probability a and otherwise asserting one of the four incorrect claims. Our common-sense
knowledge was that population did not change by more than 8% per year (also tested on the
Wikipedia dataset but with virtually no effect). Like “Growth”, “Pop±8%” does not always hold,
but a change of more than 8% is much rarer than a shrinking city. These constraints greatly im-




Our axiomatic common-sense (“CS”) knowledge was: nobody dies before they are born, people are
infertile before the age of 7, nobody lives past 125, all spouses have overlapping lifetimes, no child
is born more than a year after a parent’s (father’s) death, nobody has more than two parents, and
nobody is born or dies after 2008 (the “present day”, the year of the Wikipedia dump). Applying
this knowledge roughly halved convergence times, but had little effect on the results due to data
sparsity similar to that seen in the population data—while we know many birthdays and some
death dates, relatively few biographies had parent-child and spouse claims. To this we also added
knowledge of the decade (but not the exact date) in which 15,145 people were born (“CS+Decades”).
Although common sense alone does not notably improve results, it does very well in conjunction
with specific knowledge.
American vs. British Spelling
Prior knowledge allows us to find a truth that conforms with the user’s viewpoint, even if that
viewpoint differs from the norm. After obtaining a list of words with spellings that differed between
American and British English (e.g. ”color” vs. ”colour”), we examined the British National Corpus
as well as Washington Post and Reuters news articles, taking the source’s (the article author’s) use
of a disputed word as a claim that his spelling was correct. Our goal was to find the “true”
British spellings that conformed to a British viewpoint, but American spellings predominate by
far. Consequently, without prior knowledge the fact-finders do very poorly against our test set
of 694 British words, predicting American spelling instead in accordance with the great majority
of authors (note that accuracy from an American perspective is 1−“British” accuracy). Next we
assumed that the user already knew the correct spelling of 100 random words (removing these
from the test set, of course), but with little effect. Finally, we added axiomatic common-sense
(“CS”) knowledge: if a spelling a is correct and of length ≥ 4, then if a is a substring of b, a ⇔ b
(e.g. colour ⇔ colourful). Furthermore, while we do not know a priori whether a spelling is
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American or British, we do know if e and f are different spellings of the same word, and, if two
such spellings have a chain of implication between them, we can break all links in this chain (while
some American spellings will still be linked to British spellings, this removes most such errors).
Interestingly, common sense alone actually hurts results (e.g. PooledInvestment (IBT) gets 6.2%),
as it essentially makes the fact-finders more adept at finding the predominant American spellings!
However, when some correct spellings are known, results improve greatly and demonstrate IBT’s
ability to spread strong prior knowledge, easily surpassing L+I. Results improve further with more
known spellings (PooledInvestment gets 84.86% with CS+Words200IBT ).
4.7.5 The Joint Framework
Our final experiments combine generalized and constrained fact-finding to create the full, joint
framework, capable of leveraging a very broad set of background and domain knowledge in our trust
decision. We again use the Population dataset, applying the Larger2500 declarative prior knowledge
set to generalized fact-finders using the Wikipedia editor group information (administrator, normal
user, blocked user) encoded as an additional layer. The results in Table 4.7 show a significant
and consistent gain using the joint framework with Dsmooth2 across all fact-finders (with IBT; L+I
results [not shown] were only slightly lower). The top result from the Investment fact-finder rises
to 90.58%, up from 89.61% using only group information, or 89.94% using only declarative prior
knowledge, while even the very simple Sums fact-finder achieves a respectable 87.99% performance,
up from 81.82% with no background knowledge of any kind.
Discussion
Because generalized and constrained fact-finding are orthogonal, they are easily merged by sim-
ply constraining the generalized fact-finder as we would a standard fact-finder. As both of these
approaches are polynomial time, so too is their joint application.
Additionally, there is also a broader lesson that may be taken away from these results: not
only are generalized and constrained fact-finding orthogonal, but so are the contributions of the
different types of knowledge they represent. Combining the source attributes, claim similarities, and
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Table 4.7: Experimental Results for the Joint Framework.
Starting from the top, results correspond to standard, generalized, constrained and joint
fact-finding on the population dataset.
Prior Knowledge Group Layer Sum TFc A·L Inv1.2 Inv1.2/Avg Pool1.4/Avg
∅ No Groups 81.82 84.42 80.84 87.99 87.99 80.19
∅ Unsmoothed 83.77 83.44 84.42 83.44 88.64 64.94
∅ Dsmooth2 84.74 84.09 82.79 88.96 89.61 84.74
Larger2500IBT No Groups 85.06 87.34 84.74 89.29 89.29 84.09
Larger2500L+I No Groups 85.06 86.69 84.42 89.94 89.94 84.09
Larger2500IBT Unsmoothed 87.34 86.04 86.69 85.71 89.94 72.40
Larger2500IBT D
smooth
2 87.99 87.66 86.69 90.58 90.26 87.99
assertion uncertainty that is encoded by a generalized fact-finder with the specific and axiomatic
declarative knowledge enforced by constrained fact-finding produces an almost additive gain in the
joint framework. Although adding information may not always result in a linear gain to the quality
of a trust decision, there is clearly substantial advantage to using all that is available to us.
4.8 Conclusion
We have introduced a new framework for incorporating a broad range of information into our trust
decisions by augmenting fact-finding algorithms, both by generalizing the fact-finders themselves
and by constraining them with declarative prior knowledge. Generalized fact-finding allow us to
encode factors such as information extraction and source uncertainty, similarity between the claims,
and source groupings and attributes, with substantial and consistent performance gains across a
broad range of fact-finders. Our declarative prior knowledge, expressed as constraints over the
belief in the claims, proved vital in the case where the user’s subjective truth differed from the
norm in the Spelling domain, but even in our other experiments where the “truth” is less contested
both axiomatic common-sense and specific knowledge provided significant benefit; moreover, as the
constraints are enforced by a linear program, our framework remains polynomial-time, an essential
characteristic when dealing with real-world “web-scale” data. As both generalized and constrained
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fact-finding are orthogonal, they may be readily used together, achieving better results than were
possible with either method alone and allowing the full breadth of the information available to be





Fact-finding can be understood to be a structured learning problem where the source trustworthiness
and truth of the claims are the latent variables. Building upon our work in Constrained Fact-
Finding, we can abstract from efficiently applying declarative knowledge to constrain the belief
in claims to constraining latent variables on arbitrary structured learning tasks, introducing a
framework known as Generalized Constrained Models. Indeed, Constrained Fact-Finding can be
understood to be a specific instance of (Iterated) GCMs, and from the relatively narrow perspective
of trust, the primary benefit of this is that GCMs allow us to apply the kind of declarative knowledge
used in Constrained Fact-Finding to other trust algorithms, including the Latent Trust Analysis
model in the next chapter, but the applications are actually far broader, extending to the extremely
varied problems addressed by structured learning in general.
5.1 Summary
Structured learning allows us to jointly predict multiple, interdependent labels in problems as diverse
as information extraction, vision, and, of course, information trustworthiness. However, complex
dependencies among the output variables demand require complex models to be captured directly,
often resulting in intractable learning and inference. Consequently, methods such as Constrained
Conditional Models (CCMs) [70], Posterior Regularization (PR) [33], and Constraint Driven Learn-
ing (CODL) [15] have been introduced, combining relatively simple models with prior knowledge
in the form of declarative constraints. However, when the simple model’s prediction violates the
constraints, these methods do not find the most likely constraint-satisfying alternative, but instead
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rely on a specific, essentially arbitrary selection function (the metric). We show that the correct,
probability-maximizing metric depends on the character of the model’s error, and introduce the
metric-agnostic Generalized Constrained Model (GCM) to leverage it. When this metric is diffi-
cult to obtain analytically, or computationally infeasible, a GCM may alternatively use a compact,
convex metric; this class of metrics allows both the polynomial complexity of PR and the ease of
implementation of CCMs and CODL, with our experiments demonstrating comparable or improved
accuracy.
5.2 Introduction
There are often non-local dependencies that can be learned by a supervised structured learning
algorithm, but only at the cost of a possibly exponential number of new features and parameters:
for example, in named entity recognition we may know that all mentions of the same entity must
be the same type (if “George Washington” is a person in one sentence, he is still a person in the
next). These dependencies are thus often ignored in favor of simpler models requiring fewer training
examples. There may also be a variety of background knowledge (e.g. a name preceded by “USS”
refers to a ship, not a person, as in “USS George Washington”) that is likewise highly informative,
but, again, difficult to encode within a model or its parameters.
However, when dependencies and background knowledge are expressed as declarative constraints
(“all mentions of the same entity are the same type”, “each face has exactly one nose”, “all U.S.
presidents must be at least 35”, etc.), we can maintain a simple model (e.g. a Markov model
capturing only “local” dependencies among variables) and add an additional “global” inference
step to enforce the constraints by correcting the model’s prediction. When we choose the highest-
probability constraint-satisfying label according to the underlying supervised model (an NP-hard
task), this is a Constrained Conditional Model. Perhaps counterintuitively, this rarely results in
the truly most likely satisfying label, as discussed later. Posterior Regularization takes a different
approach, at each step correcting the predicted distribution over the latent variables by finding a
new distribution that satisfies the constraints in expectation and minimizes the KL-divergence with
71
the original prediction; while this is polynomial-time, the min-KL-divergence distribution, like the
max-probability label, is not the most likely distribution.
Instead, the appropriate metric to optimize depends on the error of the underlying model: when
its prediction violates our constraints, we need to know which of the alternate constraint-satisfying
labels (or label distributions) is most likely. Ideally, we can determine this metric analytically;
however, as error derives from a complex interplay of insufficient or noisy training examples and
the inherent limits of a model’s expressive power, we may instead empirically select a “best-fit”
metric for the problem, e.g. by testing different metrics on a development set.
These observations motivate Generalized Constrained Models, which generalize and subsume
both the supervised CCMs and the semi-supervised Constraint Driven Learning (iteratively-applied
CCMs) and PR (iteratively-applied KL-divergence minimization), abstracting from specific to arbi-
trary metrics and allowing the constraint of both discrete labels and label distributions. For convex
metrics with a polynomial length description (convex and compact), GCMs maintain CCMs’ (and
CODL’s) treatment of the underlying model as a “black box”, with minimal implementation effort
and, like PR, enjoy polynomial-time complexity.
In the remainder of this chapter, we first show that minimizing KL-divergence (PR), maximizing
probability (CCMs and CODL), or optimizing any other particular metric is improper because
the correct metric depends on the error exhibited by the underlying model. This motivates our
formulation of Generalized Constrained Models, and we describe compact, convex metrics that have
computational and implementation advantages over PR, CCMs and CODL and can be used when
the correct metric is hard to derive or infeasible. We also adapt GCMs to obtain an iterative semi-
supervised algorithm, and then perform experiments comparing GCMs with existing approaches.
5.3 Related Work
5.3.1 Structured Learning
In learning a structured classifier [9], we wish to obtain a function h : X → Y for observed
variables X and latent variables Y , where each yi ∈ Y ’s value depend on both X and on the
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other labels Y \ yi. This can range from sequence models such as Hidden Markov Models (HMMs)
[10] to the more sophisticated Markov Random Fields [71] to non-probabilistic models such as
Structured Perceptron [21] and Structured SVM [81]. In these models, the dependencies among
the yi’s are captured within the features and parameters; for example, the relationship between
two adjacent states in an HMM are captured by a transition matrix specifying P (statet|statet−1).
Unfortunately, as the degree of dependency increases, the number of required parameters tends
to increase exponentially; for example, a fourth-degree HMM, where each state depends on the
four states preceding it (P (statet|statet−4, statet−3, statet−2, statet−1)), requires a transition matrix
|states|3 times as large as a first-degree HMM.
5.3.2 Constrained Learning and Prediction
Constrained approaches can be broadly divided into two types. The first restricts model parameters
directly, e.g. [38]’s diagonal transition models which alter the conditional probabilities of an HMM’s
transition matrix. However, such methods are limited in that they can only restrict those “local”
dependencies (e.g. between two adjacent states) that are already parameterized by the model,
and the actual encoding of prior knowledge into the parameters can be a difficult (and very model-
specific) task. This is because prior knowledge almost invariably concerns variables, not parameters:
we may know “x⇒ y ∨ z”, but how does that translate to an entry in a transition matrix?
Constraining the values of the latent variables directly by “correcting” the model’s output,
rather than its parameters, eliminates this problem. This makes enforcing the prior knowledge
straightforward, allowing truly “global” constraints without the need to augment the underlying
model, to the point where even quite simple unstructured classification models can be collated to
make structured predictions, with the dependencies among the latent variables enforced entirely
by constraints. In the supervised setting, the predominant method for applying constraints is
the aforementioned CCM [16], though a number of more specialized approaches such as [76] have
been proposed, targeted to a particular domain or learning algorithm. In the semi-supervised and
unsupervised settings, CODL and PR are of primary interest, although there are other approaches.
In Chapter 4 we applied constraints in expectation to a class of non-probabilistic models called
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fact-finders, and we examined this setting in our third set of experiments. Generalized Expectation
[58, 27] penalizes the likelihood of a parameter set θ by how far the expectation of a function
deviates from its “target” value fˆ , 4(fˆ , Eθ[f ]). These are “soft”, as opposed to “hard”, constraints:
parameters θ violating the target value are penalized, but not forbidden. [55] takes a Bayesian
approach with “measurements” (akin to target values) which the model is supposed to satisfy
under θ, with the model’s objective function rewarding those θ that are likely to do so. Interestingly,
[33] argues that both of these, General Expectation and Bayesian measurements, can be restated as
specific instances of PR, and all three systems share strengths and weaknesses, including polynomial-
time approximation and difficulty porting to new models.
5.3.3 Constrained Conditional Models and Constraint Driven Learning
In CCMs [16] and their iterative semi-supervised variant, CODL [15], the opposite is true: learn-
ing and inference are NP-hard, but the underlying model is a “black box” and thus adapting to
new models is basically effortless. A CCM takes an underlying model θ and produces a label
Y = argmaxY ∈YKPθ(Y |X), where YK is the set of labels satisfying the constraints K. The semi-
supervised CODL simply iterates this process: given a supervised learning algorithm an initial set
of parameters θ0, labeled examples L, and unlabeled examples U , for each u ∈ U a tentative label
Yu = argmaxY ∈YKPθt(Y |Xu) is predicted. New parameters θt+1 are learned from L and U (using
the provisional labels), and we then continue iterating a predetermined number of times in a manner
similar to “hard” (truncated) Expectation-Maximization (EM) [78].
For both CCMs and CODL, prediction can be implemented with an Integer Linear Program
(ILP): if the model factors as Pθ(Y |X) ∝
∏
c∈C ψ(X,Yc), where C is the set of “cliques” (though
the model not need be graphical) and Yc is the set of latent variables in clique c ∈ C, then
we can encode the constraints K as linear constraints [68] and maximize the log-linear objective∑
c∈C logψ(X,Yc). Soft constraints can be incorporated by adding a slack term sk to each linear





k∈K ρksk, where ρk is the penalty for violating k (if ρk =∞ the constraint
is hard and must be satisfied).
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The principal advantage of CCMs and CODL is the ease of implementation, requiring only data,
a learning algorithm and clique factorization, and constraints. However, it is also intractable: [15]
attempts to sidestep this by using beam-search, but this approximation cannot effectively enforce
the long-distance, non-local constraints which are often the most important. Fortunately, the ILP
can often be solved reasonably quickly in practice so long as the number of latent variables |Y |
and number of constraints K are relatively small. Still, while maximizing the probability of an
error-prone local model subject to constraints does ensure that no Y inconsistent with K will be
predicted, this does not guarantee that the consistent Y selected will actually be the most likely, or
even have a lower Hamming loss (the typical measure of accuracy) than the unconstrained prediction
would have, as we will later discuss.
5.3.4 Posterior Regularization (PR)
As CODL adds constraints to hard EM, PR adds constraints to soft EM. Here the modified
E-step is minimizing the KL-divergence between the predicted distribution q(Y ) and the distri-
bution Pθ(Y |X) provided by the model, minq,ξKL(q(Y )||pθ(Y,X)), subject to the constraints∑
c∈C(Eq[φc(X,Yc)]) − b ≤ ξ and ||ξ||β ≤ , where c ∈ C is a clique in the model, Eq[φc(X,Y )]
is the expected value of a “feature function” for that clique returning a vector of values, b is the
vector of “desired maximums” for the sum of the clique functions, and β and b adjust the degree
to which these maximums may be exceeded. The M-step, as with standard EM, then uses the
predicted distribution q(Y ) to learn a new θ. Unlike CODL, PR constrains the distribution of the
latent variables q in expectation, rather than constraining a discrete labeling exactly. For instance,
given the constraint y1 + y2 ≤ 1 where y1 and y2 are {0, 1} binary independent variables in the
underlying model, the constraint is satisfied by q if q(y1) = q(y2) = 0.5, despite the fact that we
can draw y1 = 0 ∧ y2 = 0 from q (which factors according to the model) 25% of the time. The
advantage is that PR can be run in polynomial time, though it may still be expensive in practice:
as KL-divergence is convex, the E-step minimization (done in the dual) can be performed in poly-
nomial steps, but at each step the evaluation of the gradient requires inference in the underlying
model. Another serious practical concern is model “portability”: PR requires a distinct, non-trivial
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implementation for each model, whereas CODL works universally because the model is a black
box. Finally, just as with CODL, the specific metric used by PR, KL-divergence, is essentially used
arbitrarily and cannot be expected to select the most likely distribution q given the particular error
exhibited by the underlying model.
5.4 Likelihood-Maximizing Metrics
As we will demonstrate, neither finding the constrained label distribution minimizing PR’s KL-
divergence nor finding the label maximizing CCM or CODL’s max-model-probability will yield the
most likely result. Clearly, if the label or distribution produced by θ violates our constraints, it
cannot be correct, but which label or distribution should we prefer instead?
We use constraints because the underlying model Pθ(Y |X) makes errors. We want to find the
true distribution of Y given X, P ∗(Y |X). If the error is characterized by a probability density
function (PDF) F such that F (q(Y )|Pθ(Y |X)) is proportional to the likelihood of distribution
q(Y ) = P ∗(Y |X) given that the model predicts distribution Pθ(Y |X), then F can be used to find
the most likely satisfying alternative when the model’s prediction violates the constraints.
Consider a simple example where each y ∈ Y is an independent binary variable and our
model θ predicts Pθ(Y |X) with marginal probabilities Pθ(y|X) sampled from a probability dis-
tribution defined by the PDF Fy(Pθ(y|X) = αy) ∝ e−|αy−P∗(y|X)|, giving us FY (Pθ(Y |X) =
α) ∝ ∏y∈Y e−|αy−P∗(y|X)|. Notice that this is symmetric, so that given Pθ(Y |X) the likelihood
of “q(Y ) = P ∗(Y |X)” ∝ F (q(Y )|Pθ(Y |X)) =
∏
y∈Y e
−|q(y)−Pθ(y|X)|. When Pθ(Y |X) satisfies our
constraints, we can maximize this by simply setting q(Y ) = Pθ(Y |X). However, if Pθ(Y |X) does
not satisfy our constraints K, it cannot be correct, and we must seek a new distribution q ∈ Q
(where Q is the set of all distributions satisfying K) that maximizes F (q(Y )|Pθ(Y |X)). q(Y ) is thus
P (Y |X,K, θ): the most likely distribution of Y given the data, the constraints and the underlying
model.
For convenience, we can instead minimize the negated log of F , M(q, Pθ(Y,X)) =
∑
y∈Y |q(y)−
Pθ(y|X)|, such that in this exampleM is simply the L1 (Manhattan) distance between the marginals.
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We refer to M as our metric. Note that minimizing this L1 distance uniquely finds the most likely
q(Y ) = P (Y |X,K, θ) for our model; other metrics, such as PR’s KL-divergence, yield different, less
likely q(Y ) 6= P (Y |X, θ,K). Moreover, as the error varies from model to model, there cannot be a
single correct metric for all models. In some cases, this error (and corresponding metric) can be de-
termined analytically (for example, when the model is trained on sensor values X, and the error of
each sensor value x is well-characterized, e.g. by a normal distribution); in other instances, a metric
can be selected empirically using a development set, e.g. from the set of efficient polynomial-length
convex metrics we introduce later.
To provide a concrete illustration with discrete labels, let us further assume Pθ(y1|X) =
Pθ(y2|X) = 0.9, Pθ(y3|X) = 0, and our constraint is “y1 = y2 = y3”. A CCM will find the maximum
probability constraint-satisfying label, which sets all three latent variables to false (as y1 = y2 =
y3 = T has probability 0.9·0.9·0 = 0). However, when the model’s error (characterized by F ) is con-
sidered, the event where all latent variables are true P (y1 = y2 = y3 = T ) ∝ e−|0.9−0|−|0.9−0|−|0−0| =
e−1.8 is less likely than all being false, P (y1 = y2 = y3 = F ) ∝ e−|0.9−1|−|0.9−1|−|0−1| = e−1.2. The
most likely consistent label is thus argmaxY P (Y |X, θ,K) = (y1 = T, y2 = T, y3 = T ). The CCM
predicted the consistent label (y1 = F, y2 = F, y3 = F ), which had maximum probability according
to the underlying model, but this faith is misplaced: if the model were accurate there would be no
need to constrain it!
However, there is one situation where finding the maximum probability label is the correct
thing to do. Let us say that we have a model θ that accurately predicts the latent variables in an
unconstrained domain, where labels are drawn from the true distribution P ∗(Y |X). Furthermore,
assume that we have another domain which is identical, except that P ∗K(Y |X) is constrained such
that for each Y P ∗K(Y |X) ∝ P ∗(Y |X) if Y satisfies K, and P ∗K(Y |X) = 0 if it does not (this
is equivalent to sampling Y from P ∗ and resampling when the drawn Y violates K). Here, the
maximum probability label according to θ that also satisfies K is indeed the maximum probability
label in the constrained domain. Still, while this is good news for CCMs (albeit only in a limited
transfer learning scenario), it is largely irrelevant for CODL, since if our unlabeled examples U are
taken from the unconstrained domain we should run unconstrained EM and then apply a CCM
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to the result, and if our U are from the constrained domain the model θ we induce from them
will no longer reflect the unconstrained domain and (assuming that our model cannot capture the
constraints K within its parameters or there are too few examples to do so) the model will then
exhibit error that cannot be rectified by simply discarding those labels not satisfying K and choosing
the highest-probability label that remains.
Interestingly, even with an incorrect choice of metric, constraints often still improve the results.
This may be because the metric happens to find a distribution close to P (Y |X,K, θ), but perhaps
more frequently the underlying model’s prediction of Pθ(Y |X) is simply far from the space of
feasible distributions Q: here, moving to any q ∈ Q is likely to be an improvement. Similarly, when
Q is small (due to strict constraints), all q ∈ Q are close, so again moving to any q ∈ Q helps.
This may explain why past approaches have improved performance versus unconstrained baselines
despite using arbitrary metrics.
5.5 The Generalized Constrained Model
GCMs have two variants, “hard” and “soft”. A soft GCM predicts a distribution such that q(Y ) =
P (Y |X, θ,K) where q(Y ) satisfies constraints K in expectation. Hard GCM predicts a single,
discrete label Y satisfying K exactly. For brevity, we treat a hard label as a “distribution” q(Y )
satisfying the additional constraints ∀y∈Y q(y) ∈ {0, 1}. Soft GCM requires polynomial time with a
compact, convex metric, whereas hard GCM is NP-hard (by reduction from boolean satisfiability).
In a GCM, an underlying model θ is trained on labeled data. This allows us to predict a dis-
tribution over the latent Y , Pθ(Y |X), for observed variables X. This distribution, however, does
not take our constraints K into account: if Pθ(Y |X) violates K, it cannot be correct (we relax this
when using soft constraints, where violation is unlikely rather than impossible). By considering
the model’s error expressed as F (q(Y )|Pθ(Y |X)), how relatively likely that q(Y ) is the true distri-
bution given Pθ(Y |X), we obtain a metric M(q(Y ), Pθ(Y |X)) = −log(F (q(Y )|Pθ(Y |X)) such that
argminq(Y )∈QM(q(Y ), Pθ(Y |X)), where Q is the space of distributions satisfying K, produces a
satisfying q(Y ) = P (Y |X, θ,K), the most likely distribution given the data, the underlying model
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θ, and the constraints. Notice that M need not be a true metric (with properties of symmetry,
subadditivity, etc.); we assume only M(q(Y ), q(Y )) ≤ M(q(Y ), q′(Y )) for all q′(Y ), ensuring that
if Pθ(Y |X) already satisfies K then q(Y ) = Pθ(Y |X).
Finally, we address soft constraints (soft and hard constraints are distinct and orthogonal to
soft and hard GCMs); unlike hard constraints, a soft constraint k ∈ K may be violated, but such
a violation means that a particular distribution q(Y ) is a factor of 1− P (k) relatively less likely to
be the true distribution. We assume each violation is independent. The full model is then:
P (Y |X, θ,K) = argmax
q(Y )
F (q(Y )|Pθ(Y |X))
∏
k∈K





F (q(Y )|Pθ(Y |X)) ·
∏
k∈K








Where ρk = log(1−P (k)) and νk(q(Y ), X) is the degree to which a given q(Y ) violates constraint
k given observations X; in hard GCM violations are binary (a constraint is fully violated or fully
satisfied), so νk(q(Y ), X) ∈ {0, 1}, while soft GCM’s constraints in expectation yield a [0, 1] degree
of violation, examined in more detail when we later discuss constraints. Notice that for hard
constraints (which must be satisfied), we set P (k) = 1, so ρk =∞: no violation is permitted.
5.5.1 Compact & Convex Metrics
When the model’s error, and thus the metric, cannot be determined analytically, or when it cannot
be optimized in polynomial time, we use a development set to select the best-performing metric
from a set of candidates. Metrics having two properties—convexity and “compactness” (polynomial
length in the number of variables)—can be both optimized in polynomial time (when constraints
are enforced in expectation) and optimized in a primal form that allows the underlying model to be
treated as a black box. Like CCMs, CODL, and PR, we assume that the probability Pθ(Y |X) can be
factored as the product of clique-potentials. Given this, CCM and CODL’s maximum-probability
metric can be written compactly as a linear function of length O(|C| · 2maxc∈C |c|), where |c| is the
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number of variables in clique c, although as the optimization is done with exact constraints (like
hard GCM) it is still exponential time. PR, on the other hand, applies constraints in expectation,
and though its KL-divergence metric has a number of terms exponential in the number of variables,
PR is able to optimize it in the dual, where it becomes tractable as gradient descent–however, this
requires calculating Pθ(Y |X) each time the gradient is evaluated, and, perhaps more significantly,
requires tailoring PR to each underlying model. Compact metrics (which may be exponential in
the size of largest clique, but max |c| is assumed to be small) ensure that the optimization can
be performed directly, in primal form, without reference to the underlying model—only the clique
potentials are relevant, maintaining the “plug-and-play” nature of CCMs and CODL.
Experimental Metrics
Our experiments use compact and convex metrics that can be expressed within a linear or quadratic
program, solvable with off-the-shelf, highly optimized linear programming and quadratic program-
ming packages rather than slower general purpose convex programming tools. In the equations
below, qˆ(Y ) = P (Y |X, θ) and v refers to a possible assignment to a clique of variables Yc or a single










































 qˆ(Yc = v)(qˆ(Yc = v)− q(Yc = v)),
(1− qˆ(Yc = v))(q(Yc = v)− qˆ(Yc = v))
 (VoteDistance)
5.5.2 Hard and Soft Constraints
Recall that in hard GCM constraints are enforced exactly : the corrected label q(Y ) (where all
marginals q(y) ∈ {0, 1}) always satisfy hard constraints and have binary satisfaction of soft con-
straints. In soft GCM, we seek a distribution q(Y ) satisfying the constraints in expectation. Consider
a model over two {0,1} independent variables, y1 and y2. If our model then predicts Pθ(Y |X) with
factors Pθ(y1|X) = 0.4 and Pθ(y2|X) = 0.6, but we have a constraint that y1 = y2, we could find
a corrected q(Y ) with factors q(y1) = q(y2) = 0, or q(y1) = q(y2) = 1 satisfying the constraint
exactly. However, both of these alternatives are far from our original Pθ(Y |X). Instead, we can
ask that Eq[y1] = Eq[y2], where q(Y ) is as close as possible to Pθ(Y |X) according to metric M .
This may give us (depending on M) a q(Y ) with factors q(y1) = q(y2) = 0.5; notice that the set of
distributions satisfying K in expectation is a superset of those satisfying K exactly.
5.5.3 First-Order Logic as Linear Constraints
In GCMs, our knowledge is ultimately encoded as linear constraints over variables corresponding to
cliques in the (factorized) model, where each possible assignment to the variables of clique c takes
a [0, 1] (soft GCM) or {0, 1} (hard GCM) marginal probability value q(Yc). These constraints,
along with the minimized sum of the metric and constraint violation penalties, constitute a convex
programming problem, assuming the metric is itself convex. Oftentimes, though, our constraints
are provided in first-order logic (FOL). [68] and Constrained Fact-Finding provide methods for
converting FOL into linear constraints where the convex programming variables are binary or
continuous, respectively, and correspond to single-variable marginals in q (i.e. q(y)). In our case
the convex programming variables correspond to clique-marginals (i.e. q(Yc)).
To achieve the constraint-feature type constraints of PR, where φk(Yc) is the feature value for a












φk(Yc)vqYc ≤ bk, where
vqYc is a variable corresponding to the probability of a particular assignment of Yc in the convex
program.
We first propositionalize the FOL with respect to each unlabeled example, obtaining specific
propositional formulae such as TRUE⇒ (ϕy5=a ⇒ ϕy6=b) from FOL ∀ixi = d⇒ (yi = a⇒ yi+1 =
b) (assuming the example has observed variable x5 = d). Since the truth of “xi = value” for each
example is constant, it is replaced with TRUE or FALSE as appropriate. However, notice that the
propositional variables ϕ that remain correspond to assignments to individual output variables, not
assignments to cliques like our convex program’s variables.
We next combine these propositional variables where possible. We replace any conjunction
or disjunction of ϕ’s corresponding to y’s sharing the same clique with a new, combined ϕ. For
example, if there exists a clique Yc such that {y1, y2, y3} ⊆ Yc, (ϕy1=a ∧ ¬ϕy2=b) ∨ ϕy3=b becomes
(ϕy1=a∧y2 6=b)∨ϕy3=b and then ϕ(y1=a∧y2 6=b)∨y3=b. When there is a choice as to which ϕ’s to combine,
the selection minimizing the final number of ϕ should be made (this can be done in polynomial
time via dynamic programming).
Now we simplify any negated non-literals within the propositional formulae (e.g. ¬(ϕy1=a ∨
ϕy2=b) becomes ¬ϕy1=a ∧ ¬ϕy2=b). Each formula can be thought of as a tree where each node is
either the disjunction or conjunction of its children, with (possibly negated) literals as leaves. Each
node will create one linear constraint; we start at the leaves and work our way up.
To begin, we have ϕκ propositional variables, where κ are the sets of variable assignments ϕκ
corresponds to, specified as a propositional formula; for example, ϕ(y1=a∧y2 6=b)∨y3=b corresponds to
assignments κ = {y3 = b}∪
⋃
ω 6=b{y1 = a, y2 = ω}. We calculate the associated convex programming
variable vκ =
∑
Yc:Yc∩κ6=∅ q(Yc), where Yc ∩ κ 6= ∅ denotes an assignment to the clique Yc that
contains one or more of the assignments given by κ. For a negated literal, ¬ϕκ we calculate v¬κ =
1−vκ. Using our previous κ example, if we assume the yi’s take only values a and b, using q(ω1ω2ω3)
as shorthand for q(y1 = ω1, y2 = ω2, y3 = ω3) we have vκ = q(aab)+q(abb)+q(bab)+q(bbb)+q(aaa).
Moving up the tree, we may find a disjunction η =
∨
i vi, where the vi variables correspond to




i vi), where v = min(a, b) is implemented in the convex program with “helper
constraints” v ≥ a and v ≥ b and adding the term v · r to the (minimized) objective function,




k , i.e. r is a constant larger than
the greatest possible sum of the distance and soft constraint penalties for the given example u. This
ensures min(a, b) ≤ v ≤ min(a, b)(1 + ), since the cost of increasing r beyond min(a, b)(1 + ) will
have a cost greater than any reduction in distance and constraint costs; very low  results in trivial
error.
We may also see a conjunction of ζ =
∧
i vi; here, to create our conjunction variable vζ we simply
add one constraint for each conjoined variable vi, vζ ≤ vi, ensuring vζ = mini(vi) (there are no
negated non-literals, so a higher vζ will always be preferred by the convex program as maximizing
the value of the formula).
Finally, at the top of the tree, we are left with a single variable vk corresponding to the highest-
level conjunction, disjunction or propositional variable (if the formula consisted solely of a single
such variable). We now simply require that vk ≥ 1− νk, that is, that the formula is satisfied with
degree of violation νk ∈ {0, 1} (hard GCM) or νk ∈ [0, 1] (soft GCM).
In hard GCM, every v ∈ {0, 1}, and our set of linear constraints will enforce the constraints
exactly. In soft GCM, however, we have created what can be seen as an optimistic interpretation
of the FOL in expectation; in particular, if a constraint can be satisfied given a certain dependency
between two clique assignments, it is taken to be satisfied. For example, if we have two cliques each
consisting of single variables a and b, then we enforce a∨ b with the linear constraint equivalent to
a+ b ≥ 1: if a = b = 0.5, the constraint is satisfied as mutual exclusion is implicitly assumed
5.6 Iterated GCMs for Semi-Supervised Learning
CODL performs semi-supervised learning by iterative application of a CCM. Similarly, an iterated
GCM (IGCM) repeatedly learns a parameter set θ, predicts a distribution q(Y ) via a GCM, learns
a new θ, and iterates until convergence. Six inputs are required: labeled data L = (XL,YL),
unlabeled data U = (XU), a supervised learning algorithm producing a model θ, a metric M ,
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constraints K, and constraint weights ρK . When |L| = 0, CDL is unsupervised. Like CODL and
PR, an IGCM can be viewed as a modified form of EM:






Maximization :θt = argmax
θ
γ logPθ(YL|XL) + Eqt [logPθ(YU|XU)]
Here, qt = qt(YU) represents the distribution over YU, the latent variables of the unlabeled
data. νk(q,XU) =
∑
u∈U νk(q(Yu), Xu) is the [0, |U|] degree to which q violates k, summed over
all instances u ∈ U. In the M-step, γ is the relative weight of the labeled to unlabeled examples,
matching an identical γ parameter in CODL. In practice, the supervised learner calculates the
updated θ given the (γ-weighted) labeled data L and the tentatively labeled U = (XU,q
t(YU))
just as it would in standard EM: no modification to the learning algorithm is required.
The expectation step predicts q(Y ) via a GCM. Using a soft (q(Y ) is a distribution) or hard
(q(Y ) is a label) GCM yields soft or hard iterated GCM, respectively, analogous to soft and hard
EM [78]. When we have finished iterating, we have the option of either using the learned θ to predict
q(Y ) for a new example X, or using our constraints to correct that prediction as a GCM. Using a
GCM in the final inference usually yields significantly higher accuracy, but at the computational
cost of performing another optimization, which may be important when hard GCM is used and the
number of examples to be labeled is large.
5.6.1 Soft and Hard IGCMs
Soft and hard IGCMs are analogous to soft and hard EM [78], and iteratively predict q(YU) via
soft and hard GCMs, respectively. Notice also that CODL, which trains θ on discrete maximum-
probability labels YU, is a hard EM approach, while PR, which trains θ on a satisfying distribution
q(YU) over the labels, is akin to soft EM. In hard IGCM, we require the q(YU) found in the E-step
to be a discrete labeling, such that ∀u∈U∀y∈Yu∀valuesq(y = value) = {0, 1}. The principal advantage
of hard CDL, like CODL and hard GCCMs, is that the constraints can be enforced exactly (all
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Y drawn from q(Y ) must satisfy K, assuming hard constraints), but, also like CODL, hard CDL
“loses” information by selecting a single discrete label as compared to finding a label distribution.
Soft CDL, like soft GCCMs and PR, runs in polynomial-time, but enforces constraints in expectation
rather than exactly, which avoids the information loss of hard GCCM but constrains the latent
variables less strictly than hard CDL. In our experiments we find that hard CDL does generally
outperform soft CDL, but in some situations, such as in our third set of experiments, predicting a
distribution rather than a specific label proves more valuable than enforcing the constraints exactly;
moreover, as soft CDL can be run (very efficiently) in polynomial-time, it may be preferable for
larger-scale problems even at the cost of accuracy.
5.7 Experiments
5.7.1 Synthetic
We begin with a simple set of semi-supervised, synthetic problems, where a small number of labeled
and large number of unlabeled examples is available for each problem. In each problem, each latent
variable yi ∈ Y is dependent upon 10 corresponding observed features Xi (each x ∈ Xi taking one of
5 values) according to a Naive Bayes model, such that P (yi = v|Xi) ∝ P (yi = v)
∏
x∈Xi P (x|yi = v).
This leaves the yi independent of each other; however, we also constrain Y . In the elementary
“same” problem we have two binary y which always take the same value (y1 = y2). In “close
3”, we
have three y taking integer values in [0, 4], where |y1−y2| ≤ 3 and |y2−y3| ≤ 3; the similar “close1”
has the stricter restriction that |y1 − y2| ≤ 1 and |y2 − y3| ≤ 1. In each problem, examples (X,Y )
are drawn according to the Naive Bayes model for each yi; those that do not satisfy the relevant
constraint on Y are discarded and redrawn.
Our results (table 5.1) in the supervised setting cover the unconstrained Naive Bayes model
with no metric (“none”), PR’s minimized KL-divergence, CCMs, and three instantiations of soft
GCMs using metrics VD2 (squared VoteDistance), L22 (squared L2 distance), and LVD2 (squared
Log-VoteDistance). In the semi-supervised case, we have unconstrained EM, PR, CODL, and
three instantiations of soft iterated GCMs. The accuracies reported are the percent of y’s whose
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Table 5.1: Synthetic Experiment Results. |L| and |U| are labeled and unlabeled examples.
Constraints |L| |U| Setting None PR CCMCODL VD2 L22 LVD2
Same 5 100 Supervised 72.70 76.20 76.80 76.80 76.80 76.80
Same 5 100 Semi-Supervised 88.10 94.70 88.20 96.40 96.40 95.90
Same 5 200 Supervised 72.00 76.15 76.70 76.70 76.70 76.70
Same 5 200 Semi-Supervised 89.40 95.25 90.55 95.70 95.85 96.20
Close1 5 100 Supervised 39.97 42.87 42.80 42.20 41.67 42.40
Close1 5 100 Semi-Supervised 53.90 65.30 54.60 66.87 64.30 62.57
Close1 10 100 Supervised 48.03 51.17 51.03 51.03 50.47 51.40
Close1 10 100 Semi-Supervised 60.07 70.50 60.80 72.23 70.33 69.07
Close3 5 100 Supervised 40.60 40.83 40.87 40.80 40.70 40.80
Close3 5 100 Semi-Supervised 51.97 54.10 48.10 54.73 54.67 54.27
Close3 10 100 Supervised 46.73 46.90 46.90 46.97 46.80 46.93
Close3 10 100 Semi-Supervised 60.83 60.93 53.67 61.30 61.87 61.40
value was correctly predicted (Hamming loss), with argmaxvq(yi = v) as our label for each yi.
Each experiment was run 10 times with randomly-generated Naive Bayes models, and the results
averaged.
Interestingly, CCMs do relatively well as they enforce the constraints exactly in their predictions,
unlike EM, PR and soft GCMs. However, this advantage disappears in the semi-supervised setting,
with CODL sometimes significantly underperforming even unconstrained EM. PR, on the other
hand, demonstrates fairly strong performance; we modified the PR algorithm slightly to enforce
constraints on the final prediction, minimizing KL-divergence with what the PR-trained underlying
model original predicted. Compared to “standard” PR, this change improved accuracy by an
average of 1.2%. Still, (I)GCMs using squared VoteDistance significantly outperform PR overall,
while maintaining the practical advantages of treating the underlying model as a black box.
5.7.2 Information Extraction from Ads
To further compare with CCMs and CODL, we follow [15], which predicted fields in a set of 8,767 San
Francisco area apartment listings from June 2004 (here our constraints were encoded in FOL and
thus inapplicable to PR). The twelve possible fields identify what attributes (if any) are described
by the text, such as the amount of rent or the size of the dwelling. The underlying model is a first
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Table 5.2: Information Extraction Results
Supervised Semi-Supervised
Metric Soft Hard Soft Hard
None N/A 76.62 78.62 N/A
CCM / CODL N/A 77.77 N/A 78.12
WeightedSum 78.23 78.24 79.2 79.2
L1 76.63 78.02 77.8 78.91
L22 77.45 78.02 79.18 78.91
VoteDistance 76.35 78.02 76.41 78.91
L1-Marginals 77.36 77.95 78.31 79.58
LogWeightedL22 77.41 77.33 78.11 78.69
LogWeightedL1 77.01 77.36 77.82 78.67
WeightedL1 77.3 77.24 78.68 78.43
order HMM, with the tokens as observed variables and the field each token belongs to as the latent
variables. A number of constraints (such as “a field boundary can only occur on punctuation or a
newline”) are employed to enforce prior knowledge about the domain; we translated these to FOL
and then into linear constraints. As the constraints do not always hold (e.g. a field boundary might
be somewhere else), the constraints are soft. [15] uses a violation penalty of ρk = −log(0.1) for all
constraints k ∈ K and a γ = 0.9 (each labeled example has 9 times the weight of an unlabeled one);
for consistency we use these same parameters, although ρk = ∞ (hard constraints) yields better
results in some cases. 100 labeled and 1000 unlabeled examples were used, with an additional,
separate set of 100 examples for evaluation; the accuracy reported in Table 5.2 is the percentage of
tokens whose field was correctly predicted. We present both supervised (GCM) and semi-supervised
(IGCM) results. Though the CCM was better than using the HMM alone (“None”), CODL was
surprisingly worse than standard EM, while soft IGCM with the WeightedSum metric outperformed
all but hard IGCM with L1-marginals, despite being polynomial time and only enforcing constraints
in expectation.
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5.7.3 Prior Knowledge in Fact-Finders
Our third set of experiments use IGCM with non-probabilistic models by replicating the biography
constrained fact-finder experiments of Chapter 4, with the intent of showing that soft IGCM can,
in polynomial time, outperform both NP-hard CODL and hard IGCM when the less-strict enforce-
ment of FOL constraints in expectation is balanced by the preservation of information inherent in
constraining distributions rather than finding specific labels. By normalizing belief scores to create
distributions, it is possible to treat them akin to probabilities; indeed, constrained fact-finders can
be seen as a specialized variant of soft IGCM using the VoteDistance metric. With 184,258 claims
made by Wikipedia editors and a test set of 2,685 true birth and death dates to evaluate against,
we used common-sense prior knowledge (e.g. “nobody has more than two parents” and “nobody
lives past 125”) and knowledge of the decade in which 15,145 people were born (e.g. “John Smith
was born in the 1970s”) to run hard and soft IGCM with various metrics using the top-performing
PooledInvestment fact-finder. The accuracies in Table 5.3 are the percent of true claims correctly
identified as such by the algorithm. As anticipated, soft IGCM performs better by avoiding com-




We have introduced Generalized Constrained Models for the supervised and semi-supervised set-
tings, encoding background knowledge and non-local dependencies of the latent variables in the
form of constraints on top of a simpler underlying model. While past approaches such as PR, CCM
and CODL have arbitrarily committed to a particular metric to choose a satisfying label or distri-
bution, we have shown that the correct choice—and thus, the correct metric—depend on the error
exhibited by the underlying model. When this error cannot be readily analyzed, we can empirically
select from a set of compact, convex metrics that allow any underlying model to be easily used as
“black box” (unlike PR) and can be optimized in polynomial-time (unlike CCMs and CODL), with





A fact-finder may be viewed as having semantics defined by its update rules, essentially creating a
system of transitive voting. There is no attempt to explain or model why sources make the claims
they do, but rather there are “votes” that flow from sources to claims and back to sources according
to mechanics set by domain experts in a manner that is expected to ultimately transfer more votes to
true claims than untrue claims and more votes to trustworthy sources than untrustworthy sources.
While this results in highly efficient algorithms and often works well in practice, particularly
when additional information is provided via Generalized and Constrained Fact-Finding, there are a
number of important limitations of fact-finders: they do not tell a “generative story” that can ex-
plain how a trust decision was obtained to users (and researchers), they cannot perform supervised
or semi-supervised learning of source trustworthiness and claim belief outside of ad hoc modifica-
tions, and they can be difficult to modify or analyze in a principled way. In this chapter we address
these shortcomings by introducing Latent Trust Analysis (LTA), a strongly principled, probabilistic
type of trust model where the truth of a claim is treated as a latent variable and the trustworthi-
ness of a source is captured by a set of model parameters. In conjunction with the Generalized
Constrained Models of the previous chapter, LTA models are able to capture all of the information
a joint Generalized Constrained Fact-Finder can (and more) with well-justified Bayesian semantics.
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6.2 Introduction
Previous trust algorithms such as reputation networks and fact-finders have, at their heart, been
based upon some form of transitive voting; in a reputation network, this may mean trusting B
because you trust A and A trusts B, while in fact-finders this may mean believing claim C made by
source A because A also claims D, E and F , which you already believe. Explaining precisely how
sources decide which claims to assert is, of course, impossible to do exactly—particularly where
sources are people, their underlying psychology and reasoning would be far too difficult to model
even for an individual, and a given problem often involves thousands of sources or more. However,
by making judicious assumptions and simplifications, we hope to approximately model this process
and, in so doing, provide a digestible explanation that will allow users to understand the trust
algorithm and thus trust it more than they would one of the more opaque methods of previous
work; after all, even an accurate trust system is useless if users refuse to trust the system itself!
Moreover, once we establish a mathematical “story”, it may be readily modified: the Latent Trust
Analysis approach we present is not a single model, but rather a principled probabilistic method of
approaching the trust problem (much as fact-finders can be seen as a broad family of algorithms
that use a pair of rules for iteratively updating source trustworthiness and claim belief), and the
extensions we suggest later are far from exhaustive.
Fundamentally, a Latent Trust Analysis model is a probabilistic model where the truth of a claim
(or, equivalently, the one true claim from among a mutual exclusion set of claims) is a latent variable,
the trustworthiness of a source (its capacity and inclination for making true claims) is captured
by one or more parameters, and each assertion (“source s states P (c) = x”) is an observation.
More sophisticated LTA models can augment these basic elements with additional parameters (e.g.
measuring the “difficulty” of a mutual exclusion set) and observations (e.g. observed properties of
the source, such as its grammatical correctness or credentials). However, simple LTA models may
have significant computational advantages: the aptly-named Simple-LTA model we present in this
chapter can perform the unsupervised learning needed to induce the trustworthiness parameters
and claim probabilities using quickly-calculable closed-form expectation-maximization [23] E and
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M steps which, in fact, correspond exactly to a fact-finder’s update rules, which means that Simple-
LTA can also be seen as the first well-justified probabilistic fact-finder, bridging the fact-finding and
LTA families of trust algorithms. In general, however, when closed-form M step cannot be derived,
as in the relatively complex HEAD-LTA model (Honesty, Expertise, Attribute and Difficulty-based
LTA), we must use a more computationally demanding method to maximize the expected log-
likelihood, such as gradient descent, Netwon’s method [77], or a Quasi-Newton method like L-
BFGS [56]; however, by using generalized expectation-maximization [63] we need only improve,
rather than maximize, our log-likelihood in each step, allowing us to tractably apply our model to
large real-world datasets, as our experiments on the Population dataset demonstrate.
6.3 Related Work
6.3.1 Reputation Networks
Some reputation networks have probabilistic interpretations: in PageRank [13], for example, the
score of a particular page is determined by link network topology, but can be viewed as how often
a random walk visits that page given some restart frequency. However, unlike a generative LTA
model, this does not explain how links are made, nor does it explicitly determine the trustworthiness
of the page, but rather finds the probability of being on a particular page after a random walk long
enough to ensure the mixing of the Markov chain. By contrast, other reputation approaches, such
as Hubs and Authorities [49], explicitly seek to obtain a trustworthiness value (or equivalent, such
as hub and authority scores) but despite the often-simple rules for trust transference, the ultimate
result of such systems (and how they arrived there) is difficult to explain, lacking ready semantics
or a probabilistic “story” of any kind.
6.3.2 Fact-Finders
Several fact-finders contain probabilistic elements; for example, TruthFinder [86] calculates claim
belief as 1 −∏s:s→c 1 − T (s), with the idea that T (s) is the probability that s tells the truth, so
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the probability that a claim is wrong is the probability that all the (independent) sources are liars.
However, this probabilistic explanation falls apart when there are other, mutually exclusive claims,
which usually results in assigning “probabilities” over mutually exclusive possibilities summing to
more than 1. Perhaps more interestingly, [82] explicitly seeks to provide a Bayesian justification for
a fact-finder, but this depends on unrealistic assumptions, the chief being that P (s→ c|c)/P (s→
c) ≈ 1, that is, the probability of a source making a claim given that the claim is true divided by
the unconditional probability of the source making the claim is close to 1. In general this is not
the case: if half of all claims are true such that P (c) = 0.5, a source that tells the truth 90% of
the time such that P (c|s → c) = 0.9, and asserts 1% of claims such that P (s → c) = 0.01, then
P (s → c|c) = 0.018, almost double P (s → c). There is, however, no fundamental reason that a
fact-finder cannot capture a full probabilistic model, and indeed, the Simple-LTA model we will
present has Expectation-Maximization steps that can be viewed as corresponding to a fact-finder’s
T (s) and B(c) update rules.
6.3.3 Representations of Uncertainty
Our observations are not necessarily the unqualified “source s makes claim c” assertions of standard
fact-finders, and instead allow for the same detail provided by generalized fact-finders, where the in-
formation extractor’s confidence and the source’s certainty were captured by weighting by weighting
the assertions. In LTA, however, we view the source as providing a distribution over the claims in a
mutual exclusion set (e.g. “source s states claim c has probability x”) and consider the confidence
weight (as professed by either the source or the information extractor) separately. This confidence
is analogous to the gap between belief and plausibility in Dempster-Shafer theory [87, 75] or the
equivalent-but-explicit “uncertainty” of subjective logic [44, 43] (equal to 1 − belief − disbelief).
In our case, however, the confidence qualifies a classical Bayesian distribution with facile, natural
semantics (for example, two identical distributions asserted with confidence 0.5 are equivalent to
the same distribution asserted with full confidence [1]), a major advantage over more nuanced al-
ternatives given that we must both interpret the statements of sources (and simple probabilities of




In Latent Trust Analysis, sources assert distributions over the claims in each mutual exclusion set
(e.g. “President Obama was born in 1961 with 90% probability, and in 1962 with 10% probability”),
each with a degree of confidence from the source itself (e.g. “I am 50% confident in this distribution”)
or from information extraction (e.g. “I am 50% confident that the source asserted this distribution”).
The asserted probability of a particular claim c by source s is bs,c, and for each mutual exclusion
set m,
∑
c∈m bs,c = 1; we will use Ds,m to refer to the distribution over a mutual exclusion set as
a whole, such that Ds,m = {bs,c : c ∈ m}. The confidence of the source (or information extractor)
in the distribution over the claims in mutual exclusion set m is then ws,m. The distributions are
observed variables ({Ds,m} ⊆ X), while the confidences can be better described as conditioning
variables or constants which are, from the model’s perspective, given and not generated.
The distributions selected by the sources depend on the given {ws,m} values (a distribution
produced by a less confident source—or extracted by a less confident information extractor—will
tend to be less concentrated) as well as the trustworthiness of a source (a set of parameters ⊂ θ
corresponding to each source s) and, of course, which claim in mutual exclusion set m is actually
true, denoted ym ∈ Y , where Y are our latent variables (if c is the true claim in m, ym = c).
For observed variables X, latent variables Y , and parameters θ, we define the LTA model as the
joint probability of all three: P (X,Y, θ) = P (X,Y |θ)P (θ). An LTA model can thus be learned by
finding argmaxθ P (X, θ) = argmaxθ
∑
Y P (X,Y, θ) = argmaxθ
∑
Y P (X,Y |θ)P (θ), the maximum
a posteriori (MAP) estimate of θ.
6.5 Simple-LTA
Assume there are only two claims in a mutual exclusion set, and ∀s,c bs,c ∈ {0, 1} (in real-world
domains, this case—where the source asserts only a single claim as having probability 1—is com-
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mon); if we characterize the source’s trustworthiness as a single parameter θs then the probability
of asserting the true claim is just the source’s trustworthiness θs, and the probability of asserting
the false claim is just 1 − θs. Extending this basic idea to additional claims and bs,c ∈ [0, 1] gives
us the Simple-LTA model.
In Simple-LTA, if we assume that there is full confidence in a source’s asserted distribution
(ws,m = 1), the source asserts the true claim c ∈ m with belief bs,c with probability P (bs,c|ym =
c, θs) ∝ (θs)bs,c , and similarly asserts a false claim with probability P (bs,c|ym 6= c, θs) ∝ (1−θs)bs,c .
When there is less than full confidence (ws,m < 1) the distribution of belief asserted by the source
is likely to be less concentrated; incorporating ws,m into our probability estimates then gives:
P (bs,c|ym = c, θs) ∝ (θs)bs,cws,m
P (bs,c|ym 6= c, θs) ∝ (1− θs)(1−bs,c)ws,m










The last equation gives the probability of the entire distribution asserted by s over m, with the
simplification in the last line due to the distributionality of Ds,m; since the beliefs over the claims
of m must sum to 1, we know that
∑
bs,c ∈ Ds,m\bs,c¯ bs,c = 1 − bs,c¯. Because the distributions are
“generated” independently by the sources, given the truth and their trustworthiness parameters,












Finally, noting that the Xm are independent given the true claims Y and the source trustwor-













To get the joint probability of the truth Y and the observations X given the parameters, we
apply Bayes’ Rule: P (X,Y |θ) = P (X|Y, θ)P (Y |θ). Without knowing the claimed distributions X,
the trustworthiness of the sources θ tells us nothing about the truth Y , and thus P (Y |θ) = P (Y ).
Taking everything together, we can now state the full joint probability of the model:







bs,ym (1− θs)(1−bs,ym )
)ws,m
6.5.1 Learning the Model
To get the MAP estimate for θ in our model (and the implied distribution over Y ) we find
argmaxθ
∑
Y P (X,Y |θ)P (θ). This optimization would be very difficult to do directly, so we in-
stead apply the technique of Expectation Maximization, iteratively improving our estimate of θ at
each time step t by setting:
θt+1 = argmax
θ




P (Y |X, θt) log(P (Y,X|θ)P (θ))
This can be split into an expectation step, the straightforward calculation of P (Y |X, θt) (since the
ym are conditionally independent this amounts to finding the conditional distributions of each ym
independently), and the maximization step, where we find θt+1 using the conditional distribution
over the Y from the expectation step.
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Deriving the M-Step




























P (Y |X, θt)
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ws,m (bs,ym log(θs) + (1− bs,ym) log(1− θs))
)
If we assume that the prior probabilities on the true claim in each mutual exclusion set are
independent such that P (Y ) =
∏
































ws,m (bs,ym log(θs) + (1− bs,ym) log(1− θs))
)
Recalling that the latent variables are independent such that P (Y |X, θt) = ∏m P (ym|X, θt),
97













































P (ym1 |X, θt)
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ym2
P (ym2 |X, θt) · · ·
∑
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bs,ymi log(θs) + (1− bs,ymi ) log(1− θs)
))
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bs,ym2 log(θs) + (1− bs,ym2 ) log(1− θs)
))











bs,ymn log(θs) + (1− bs,ymn ) log(1− θs)
))
Finally, we also assume that the prior probabilities over the trustworthiness of the sources are
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ws,m (bs,ym log(θs) + (1− bs,ym) log(1− θs))
)
To find the maximizing θ, we look for the extrema of the expected log-likelihood where all the
partial derivatives are simultaneously 0, i.e. ∀s δδθs
∑





P (ym|X, θt) (. . .) = 0.












































P (ym|X, θt)ws,m(bs,ym − θs)
θs − (θs)2
The roots of this partial derivative vary, of course, with the prior probability density function
P (θs). For the simplest case of uniform probability (P (θs) = 1), we have
δP (θs)
δθs
= 0, and can easily
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assuming a uniform prior over θ.
The EM Algorithm
To learn a Simple-LTA via EM, we simply iterate the following two steps until convergence:
E− Step : ∀m, P (ym|X, θt) ∝ P (Xm|ym, θt)P (ym)







Here the E-step can be derived by first noting that P (ym, |X, θt) = P (ym|Xm, θt) because ym
is independent of all other assertions X \Xm about other mutual exclusion sets given Xm and θt.
Further, P (ym|Xm, θt) = P (Xm, ym|θt)P (Xm|θt)−1, so P (ym|Xm, θt) ∝ P (Xm, ym|θt). Finally,
given that P (ym|θ) = P (ym), P (Xm, ym|θt) = P (Xm|ym, θ)P (ym).
Interestingly, the M-step has an intuitive interpretation of setting the source’s trustworthiness
to the weighted average (weighted by ws,m · bs,ym) of the claims it asserted correctly according to
101
our current estimate of the truth P (Y |X, θt).
6.5.2 Using Simple-LTA
Connection to Fact-Finding
Simple-LTA is highly tractable: we have closed-form EM update steps, and each EM iteration takes
time O(|S| · |C|), the number of sources times the number of claims. Moreover, the E- and M-steps
of the EM learning algorithm can also be viewed as the Belief and Trust functions, respectively,
of a fact-finder. Notably, in addition to being a Latent Trust Analysis model, Simple-LTA is thus
also the first principled, generative fact-finding algorithm, providing the very low computational
demands of fact-finding algorithms as well as the benefits of LTA models in general (probabilistic
explanation of trust decisions, semi-supervised and supervised learning, etc.)
Discussion
The tradeoff for such amenable computation complexity is, of course, expressivity: Simple-LTA is
unable to capture aspects of the problem such as a source’s difficulty in choosing the true claim
from a mutual exclusion set (as in the HEAD-LTA model). However, Simple-LTA also requires
fewer assumptions and allows us to tell a very natural story that is, essentially, “a source with
trustworthiness θs tells the truth with probability θs”. Furthermore, rather than making the model
more expressive (and complex) to improve accuracy, we can instead regularize it via our P (Y )
and P (θ) priors, or apply declarative knowledge via Generalized Constrained Models; Simple-LTA
may be especially useful when there is too little data to learn the myriad parameters of more
sophisticated LTA models.
6.6 HEAD-LTA
Compared to Simple-LTA, the HEAD (Honesty, Expertise, Attributes and Difficulty) LTA model
has a more complex generative story; now, instead of a single trustworthiness parameter, a source
has an intrinsic honesty, intrinsic expertise, and observed attributes that correspond with honesty
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claim c?
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Figure 6.1: Honesty, Expertise, observed Attributes, and Difficulty (HEAD) LTA model outline
showing the factors that contribute to a source’s decision to assert a claim.
and expertise (for example, we may observe that the source is a Wikipedia administrator or a
Ph.D.). Mutual exclusion sets have a difficulty associated with them that, together with the source’s
expertise, determines the likelihood that the source knows what the true claim is, while the source’s
honesty determines whether he asserts the truth if he does know.
Modeling both honesty and expertise allows us to capture common phenomena such as ignorant-
but-honest sources, able to correctly answer “easy” questions but making honest mistakes for harder
cases, and vandalistic sources, who know the truth but sometimes opt to lie instead (this is a
surprisingly common real-world phenomenon; e.g. many Wikipedia vandals also make genuine
edits).
6.6.1 Observations and Parameters
Just as in the Simple-LTA model, we will observe asserted distributions over claims with confidence
weights and our latent variables Y will be the true claims in each mutual exclusion set. However,
instead of a single trustworthiness parameter θs, each source has an intrinsic honesty θ
H
s and




A source may have observable attributes that tell us how honest it is (e.g. whether the source
has been blocked from Wikipedia) and how much expertise it has (e.g. educational attainment).
These attributes are provided as vectors of features XHs (honesty) and X
K
s (expertise). Not every
feature need be known for every source (missing values are permissible), and each feature may be
binary, multinomial, or continuous; we will henceforth assume binary features for simplicity, but
the extension to other types is straightforward.
As we will see, these features are treated as being caused or generated independently as a result
of the source’s honesty or expertise, essentially becoming the features and labels of a Naive Bayes
classifier.
Parameters
θHs is the [0, 1] probability of a source telling the truth in the absence of any observed evidence;
when we compute the probability of the source being honest, θHs can be thought of as the prior
probability of honesty used in the Naive Bayes prediction. However, θHs itself has a prior, P (θ
H
s ),
which essentially determines the likelihood that the actual honesty of a source deviates from the
honesty predicted from its observed attributes (spelling and grammar, academic degrees, etc.).
A very concentrated P (θHs ) distribution, such as Beta(90, 10), means that θ
H
s is unlikely to vary
much and, in effect, variation among the honesty of sources will depend almost entirely on their
attributes. A relatively flat P (θHs ) distribution such as Beta(1.09, 1.01), on the other hand, allows
θHs to vary widely, and the observed attributes become less important than our estimate of the
source’s individual, innate tendency towards honesty.
For the Naive Bayes honesty prediction, we also need to know the probability of the observation
conditioned on the sources’ honesty. These conditional probabilities are the same across all the
sources, so, assuming binary features, we need 2|XHs | parameters: {θP (x|H) : x ∈ XHs }∪{θP (x|¬H) :
x ∈ XHs }. Note that since these parameters are shared, the conditional probability of a particular
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feature value given that a source is honest or dishonest is the same for everyone.
θEs ∈ R is the “expertise” of a source is a real number that is compared against the “difficulty”
θDm ∈ R of a mutual exclusion. Distinguishing the “difficulty” of a mutual exclusion set is important:
determining that the sky is blue is much easier than determining the mass of the Higgs boson, for
example. Together, these two parameters give us the prior in our Naive Bayes prediction of whether
source s knows the true claim in mutual exclusion set m. As with honesty, we also need 2|XKs |
parameters for the probability of our expertise observations conditioned on the source knowing the
answer: {θP (x|K) : x ∈ XKs } ∪ {θP (x|¬K) : x ∈ XKs }.
6.6.2 Constructing the Model
For each source s and each mutual exclusion set m, the HEAD-LTA model essentially calcu-
lates the probability that source s knows the true claim in m and the probability that source
s chooses to assert what it thinks is the true claim in m. These events (Ks,m and Hs, respec-
tively) are taken as independent, and together give us the distribution over the four possibili-
ties: (Ks,m, Hs), (Ks,m,¬Hs), (¬Ks,m, Hs)and(¬Ks,m,¬Hs). Each of these joint events then cor-
responds to a probability that source s asserts a particular distribution Ds,m over the claims in
m.
Opting for Honesty
A source may decide to lie, asserting a distribution Ds,m that does not accord with his actual belief.
We assume that the observed honesty-related features XHs are independent, so the probability that
a source opts to tell the truth is given by a Naive Bayes model:
P (Hs|XHs , θ) =
θHs
∏
x∈XHs P (x|H, θP (x|H))
θHs
∏
x∈XHs P (x|H, θP (x|H)) + (1− θHs )
∏
x∈XHs P (x|¬H, θP (x|¬H))
Because we assume binary {0, 1} features, P (x|H, θP (x|H)) = xθP (x|H) + (1− x)(1− θP (x|H)).
Note that Hs (and Ks,m) are not explicitly modeled as latent variables; rather, we are only
interested in finding the probability of these events as a subcomponent of our larger model.
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Table 6.1: P (ym = c|bs,c, Hs,Ks) given the honesty and knowledgability of the source.
Ks,m Hs Probability Description P (ym = c|...)
True True P (Ks,m|...)P (Hs|...) Knows and tells truth bs,c
True False P (Ks,m|...)(1− P (Hs|...)) Deliberately lies P (ym = c)
False True (1− P (Ks,m|...))P (Hs|...) Doesn’t know, tries honestly P (ym = c)
False False (1− P (Ks,m|...))(1− P (Hs|...)) Doesn’t know, tries to lie P (ym = c)
Knowing the Answer
The prior probability that the source knows the true claim in a mutual exclusion set is assumed to
follow the logistic function, with probability P (Ks,m|θDm, θEs ) = (1 + eθ
D
m−θEs )−1. We then combine
these with our XKs observations, again as a Naive Bayes model (albeit with a complex prior), to
get:





x∈XKs P (x|K, θP (x|K)) (1 + eθDm−θEs )−1∏x∈XKs P (x|K, θP (x|K))
+(1− (1 + eθDm−θEs )−1)∏x∈XKs P (x|¬K, θP (x|¬K))

Conditional Truth
Let us consider P (ym = c|bs,c, Hs,Ks), the probability that the true claim in mutual exclusion set
m is c given the belief asserted by s in c, bs,c, whether s is honest, and whether s knows what the
truth is. Note that there are situations where the truth is by nature uncertain (e.g. Schro¨dinger’s
cat), so bs,c ∈ (0, 1) is possible given an honest, knowledgable source. The possibilities are outlined
in Table 6.1.
Clearly, if the source is knowledgable and honest, the probability that ym = c is whatever the
source asserts it is. However, in the other three cases, P (ym = c|bs,c, Hs,Ks) must depend on our
assumptions about source behavior. A source that doesn’t know the truth, but thinks it does, can
make an honest assertion or attempt to lie; in either case, if we assume that the claim the source
actually believes to be true is uniformly selected from all possible claims in mutual exclusion set m,
Cm, the source’s assertion provides no usable information and thus the probability of ym = c is just
our a priori belief in c, P (ym = c). We will henceforth assume a uniform prior, P (ym = c) = |Cm|−1,
but more informative priors are of course also possible.
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The probability of Ym = c when s knows the truth and deliberately lies is a more difficult
question. Certainly if there were only two claims in the mutual exclusion set and s asserted the
first claim with 100% belief, if s lies deterministically we would know that the second claim must
be true. However, things are less clear is s asserts a non-zero belief amongst all claims: do sources
lie randomly, or are they somehow informative? For now, we assume that knowledgable liars assert
distributions that are independent of the truth and are thus entirely uninformative; therefore, the
probability of ym = c given the assertion of a knowledgable liar is again just our a priori belief,
P (ym = c).
Local Joint Probability




s |θ), the “local” joint probability of the true claim in m
and our observations of a single source, given the parameters:






P (Ks,m|XKs , θ) P (Hs|XHs , θ) bs,c
+P (Ks,m|XKs , θ) (1− P (Hs|XHs , θ)) |Cm|−1
+(1− P (Ks,m|XKs , θ)) P (Hs|XHs , θ) |Cm|−1









P (Ks,m|XKs , θ) P (Hs|XHs , θ) bs,c + (1− P (Ks,m|XKs , θ) P (Hs|XHs , θ) |Cm|−1
)ws,m
Thus, if a source is completely knowledgable and honest such that P (Ks,m|XKs , θ) P (Hs|XHs , θ) =
1, if ym = c, lower bs,c have linearly decreasing probability; alternatively, if a source is honest and
knowledgable, the probability of ym = c is higher when bs,c is higher. Similarly, we can see that
observations X that yield high P (Ks,m|XKs , θ) P (Hs|XHs , θ) when ym = c and bs,c is high are more




Since the distributions asserted by the sources overm are independent given θ and ym, P (X|ym, θ) =∏




s |θ)/P (ym = c|θ); since ym is independent of θ, P (ym = c|θ) = P (ym).
Assuming P (ym) is uniform, we can then calculate P (X|ym, θ) as:
P (ym = c,X|θ) ∝
∏
s∈S





Furthermore, given the parameters and the truth Y , the distributions asserted across mutual
exclusions set are generated independently from one another; again employing our assumption that






Finally, to get the full joint probability, we simply incorporate our prior over θ:
P (Y,X, θ) = P (Y,X|θ)P (θ)
6.6.3 Learning a HEAD-LTA Model
As with Simple-LTA, HEAD-LTA can be learned via expectation maximization. However, while
the E-step is still straightforward and requires simply calculating P (ym, X|θt) (normalizing to find
P (ym|X, θt)), the M-step is considerably more difficult. Whereas for Simple-LTA the M-step had
a closed form solution, in HEAD-LTA it is no longer possible to find the simultaneous roots of the
partial derivatives independently, and instead we have a system of equations that would be difficult
to solve directly. Fortunately, we can apply Quasi-Newton or other gradient-based techniques to
locate a (local) maximum by iteratively following following the gradient upward; although we may
not maximize the log-likelihood in each M-step, we will increase it, making our approach an instance
of Generalized EM [63].
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Simplifying Terms
To begin, we will simplify the P (Ks,m|...) and P (Hs|...) probabilities to convert them to logistic
functions more amenable to analysis.














x∈XKs P (x|¬K, θ)
=
∏
x∈XKs P (x|K, θ)∏
x∈XKs P (x|K, θ) + (1 + eθ
D
m−θEs )(1− (1 + eθDm−θEs )−1)∏x∈XKs P (x|¬K, θ)
=
∏
x∈XKs P (x|K, θ)∏






















P (Hs|X, θ) can be similarly converted to:




−1)+∑x∈XHs logP (x|¬H,θ)−logP (x|H,θ)
Gradients
Recall that we assume binary XKs and X
H
s features, giving us conditional probabilities of the form:
P (x|K, θ) = xθP (x|K) + (1− x)(1− θP (x|K)) = 1− θP (x|K) − x+ 2xθP (x|K)
When computing the gradients, there are a number of repeated subexpressions whose values
should be cached to improve performance. Consequently, for the sake of both computational effi-
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ciency and notational convenience, we will refer to these subexpressions using symbols:
α = θDm − θEs +
∑
x∈XKs








log(1− θP (x|¬H) − x+ 2xθP (x|¬H))− log(1− θP (x|H) − x+ 2xθP (x|H))
K = P (Ks,m|XKs , θ) =
1
1 + eα




L = log(Rbs,c + |Cm|−1 −R|Cm|−1)
Recall that we seek to maximize the expected log-likelihood of P (X,Y, θ):
EY |X,θt [log(P (X,Y |θ)P (θ))]
After some algebraic manipulation, we can rewrite this as:









We will use a Beta distribution for P (θHs ):











(H − 1)((θHs )2 − θHs )−1(bs,c − |Cm|−1)




(H − 1)(− 2x−11−θP (x|H)−x+2xθP (x|H) )(bs,c − |Cm|−1)




(H − 1)( 2x−11−θP (x|¬H)−x+2xθP (x|¬H) )(bs,c − |Cm|−1)




(K − 1)(− 2x−11−θP (x|K)−x+2xθP (x|K) )(bs,c − |Cm|−1)




(K − 1)( 2x−11−θP (x|¬K)−x+2xθP (x|¬K) )(bs,c − |Cm|−1)
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Having computed all the gradients, we are then able to find a local argmaxθ Q by any of a number
of methods that climb the gradient, with the caveat that all parameters except for θDm and θ
E
s
are [0, 1] bounded, which presents a challenge for some algorithms such as Newton’s Method and
L-BFGS which require unconstrained variables. This may be addressed by using more sophisticated
methods that support simple variable bounds such as bounded L-BFGS [14], or by replacing the
constrained variables with the [0, 1] logistic function over unconstrained variables.
To run EM we have two steps:
E− Step : ∀m, P (ym|X, θt) ∝ P (ym, X|θt)
M− Step : Find a θt+1 that increases the log − likelihood :
EY |X,θt [log(P (X,Y |θt+1)P (θt+1))] > EY |X,θt−1 [log(P (X,Y |θt)P (θt))]
Again, notice that we only ask that the log-likelihood be increased, not maximized. The gradient-
based methods we use in the M-step may only find a local, not global, maximum, but this is sufficient
to find an increasing θ (EM may, of course, itself converge to a local maximum, but this can occur
even when the M-step globally maximizes θ).
6.7 Experiments
The experiments with Latent Trust Analysis models are still in the first stages, but are promising.
We evaluated both the Simple-LTA model and the HEAD-LTA model (θHs ∼ Beta(2, 2), XHs = ∅,
XKs = ∅) on the Wikipedia Population dataset; the results are in Figure 6.2.
Among all trust algorithms, the HEAD-LTA and Simple-LTA models are second and fourth in
performance, respectively. One possible advantage that fact-finders may have on the Population
dataset is the numerous mutual exclusion sets containing only a single claim: these are effectively
ignored by Simple-LTA and HEAD-LTA because any source asserting such a singleton claim will
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Figure 6.2: Accuracy of fact-finders, Simple-LTA and HEAD-LTA on the Population dataset.
always be right regardless of trustworthiness. In many situations, this is a good thing—asserting
trivial claims should not make a source more trusted; however, in Wikipedia, the singleton claims
tend to be about more esoteric topics that only dedicated (and trustworthy) users bother with.
While a sizable number of people may dispute the population of, say, Los Angeles, and vandals may
target such popular topics, pages about small towns may see only a few edits, often by proficient,
“expert” users. Fact-finders give sources “credit” for singleton claims, and so those trustworthy
sources who happen to be proficient asserters of singleton claims are (correctly) assigned more trust
by the algorithm.
One of the benefits of LTA models is that they have well-defined semantics; consequently, we
can readily adapt them to our domain knowledge, which, in this case, is that sources asserting
singletons tend to be more trustworthy, and this is what our next set of experiments will explore.
For example, in HEAD-LTA, we can use honesty or knowledge features to capture the number of
singleton assertions a source makes directly. Alternatively, we could add “unknown” claims as we
did with fact-finders, but with the ability to provide a precise prior P (ym = unknown), or simply
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provide priors over our θ parameters corresponding to the tendency of sources with more assertions
to be more trustworthy in this domain.
6.8 Conclusion
Even without these enhancements, the Latent Trust Analysis models do remarkably well, and have
numerous other advantages over fact-finders. As principled, generative models, they tell a coherent
story of why and how sources make assertions, which, especially in the case of Simple-LTA, can be
readily explained to the user to justify a trust decision. Furthermore, the models’ crisp probabilistic
semantics grant tremendous flexibility in adapting to new domains in ways that are not possible
for fact-finders, in addition to being able to capture the same knowledge permitted by Generalized
Fact-Finding (e.g. via the honesty and expertise observed attributes [which, unlike attributes in
Generalized Fact-Finders, can be real-valued] and the ws,m certainty weights) and Constrained
Fact-Finding (via Generalized Constrained Models). Finally, as probabilistic models, there are
numerous avenues for learning; we have used expectation-maximization for unsupervised learning
analogous to that performed by fact-finders, but both semi-supervised and supervised learning are
also available to us, and potentially invaluable when the trust of some sources or the truth of some




Throughout this dissertation, we have explored a number of aspects of the information trust problem
in our pursuit of a computational trust system capable of substituting for the user’s own informed
and subjective judgement. We began by first examining how to express the trustworthiness of
an information source, document, publisher or other entity beyond assigning a simple, and often
misleading, accuracy score based on the percent of claims they made that were true. By introducing
a new, more comprehensive set of metrics corresponding to the truthfulness, completeness, and bias
of a source, we can guide the user to the resource best suited to her and relate our trust judgements
in an actionable, accessible manner that allows her to better leverage those sources she does select
(for example, by moderating her reading to account for incompleteness or bias).
Once we established a means of expressing trustworthiness, we studied progressively more so-
phisticated ways of determining trustworthiness, incorporating increasing amounts of knowledge
into our trust decisions, allowing us to escape the erroneous notion of universal “ground truth” and
instead find the subjective truth for the user given her prior knowledge and beliefs: experimentally,
we saw that this was essential even for relatively simple tasks, such as determining the true spelling
of a word. We started with the initial baseline of voting, simply choosing the claim asserted by the
most sources, with the implicit assumption that all sources are equally trustworthy. Next, we saw
that fact-finders remove this (grossly unrealistic) assumption and estimate the trustworthiness of
the source in addition to finding the true claims, but still restrict us to considering only “who said
what”. Generalized Fact-Finding, however, allows us to take advantage of the frequently highly
available and very useful additional information that is available to us, in the form of the source’s
or information extractor’s certainty in a claim (e.g. “I’m 80% sure that John said he was 60%
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sure that...”), the similarity between claims (“Hawaii is more similar to Alaska than to Kenya”),
and the attributes and membership of sources (“John has a Ph.D.”, “Sarah is a Republican”, etc.).
Constrained Fact-Finding then complimentarily introduces declarative prior knowledge, allowing us
to provide both specific facts (“Los Angeles is larger than Wichita”) and general, axiomatic rules
the world obeys (“Cities usually grow over time”). Moreover, Generalized and Constrained Fact-
Finding combine to create a joint framework which in our experiments provided an almost additive
benefit from the two orthogonal techniques, yielding performance significantly beyond what was
possible with standard fact-finders.
The idea behind Constrained Fact-Finding can also be abstracted to structured learning in
general, in the form of Generalized Constrained Models (GCMs). After the underlying “local”
model makes a prediction, the GCM corrects this prediction to be the most likely label (or label
distribution) that satisfies the the declarative prior knowledge constraints, which is the satisfying
label closest to the original according to the distance metric particular to the problem. This is
in marked contrast to Constrained Conditional Models, Posterior Regularization, and Constraint
Driven Learning, all of which arbitrarily commit to a single metric which does not typically find
the most likely satisfying label distribution. Additionally, GCMs introduce the concept of com-
pact, convex metrics, which allow a GCM to treat the underlying model as a black box (unlike
Posterior Regularization) and simultaneously achieve polynomial running time (unlike Constrained
Conditional Models and Constraint Driven Learning). From a trust perspective, though, GCMs
are important because they allow us to apply declarative prior knowledge to a new type of trust
model, Latent Trust Analysis.
Latent Trust Analysis models the generative process by which sources assert claims, with the
likelihood that a source will assert a claim essentially dependent upon whether the claim is true
and how trustworthy the source is. This provides a principled, probabilistic generative story with
a number of important advantages over fact-finders, most immediately the ability to justify the
trust decision to the user, and Simple-LTA in particular has an extraordinarily natural, intuitive
explanation that other trust algorithms lack. Even more useful is the flexibility this engenders:
the well-defined semantics permit, for example, the ready application of Bayesian priors, and the
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mechanics of the model are transparent (as opposed to the more nebulous operation of the iterative
transitive voting of fact-finders). Furthermore, unlike fact-finders, LTA models naturally support
semi-supervised and supervised learning, which can be a powerful advantage when the truth of
some claims or trustworthiness of some sources is already known.
Of course, this comes at a tradeoff: though Simple-LTA is quite elegant, the HEAD-LTA model
is the most sophisticated trust algorithm we have encountered, and, while tractable even on large
datasets, is certainly the most computationally demanding. Indeed, as we have moved up the
ladder from basic voting to LTA, we have progressively incorporated more information into our trust
decision, gaining expressiveness and predictive power at the cost of complexity and computation.
As a result, even with the development of Latent Trust Analysis models, Generalized, Constrained
and even standard fact-finding algorithms still have applications in extremely large datasets where
more sophisticated methods would be intractable, or where speed is a primary concern (e.g. making
trust judgements online, in real-time).
Perhaps most exciting, though, is that while we have studied novel algorithms and found new
ways to incorporate the plethora of data available to us and build upon the user’s prior knowledge,
there is still so much potential for further advancement. Latent Trust Analysis is the first strongly
principled approach to the information trust problem and is still largely unexplored. Conversely,
real-world applications of trust algorithms are only beginning to be realized, despite their wide
applicability to many pressing challenges, new and longstanding, in dealing with the curse (and
blessing) of overwhelming amounts of data, and this is yet another frontier upon which large gains
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